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SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, MIT AND  NBER/UNIVERSITY  OF 
CHICAGO AND  NBER 
Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle* 
1. Cyclical  Markups  and  the  Transmission  of  Aggregate 
Demand  Variations  to the  Labor  Market 
Perfectly competitive  models  of the  effects  of aggregate  demand  varia- 
tions  on  output  and  employment  have  great difficulty  generating  pat- 
terns  of  comovement  among  aggregate  variables  that resemble  typical 
"business  cycle" patterns  (Barro and King, 1984). We wish  to emphasize 
two  such  difficulties  here,  and to argue that an imperfectly  competitive 
model  of product  markets can avoid these  difficulties. 
First, price-taking  firms and a standard neoclassical  production  tech- 
nology  imply  that,  in  the  absence  of  shifts  in the  production  function 
(which  are not  what  we  would  mean  by "aggregate demand"  shocks), 
output  and  employment  fluctuations  should  be  associated  with  coun- 
tercyclical  movements in the real wage. For firms' profit-maximizing  labor 
demand  will be determined  by the condition 
FH(Kt,  H; zt) =  w  (1.1) 
where Kt  represents  the capital stock, Ht hours of labor demanded,  wt the 
real wage,  and F(Kt, Ht; zt) represents  output  given  the state of technol- 
ogy zt. For a given  capital stock Kt  and state of technology  z,  this implies 
a  downward-sloping  demand  curve  for  labor Ht as  a  function  of  wt. 
Furthermore,  an aggregate  demand  shock at time t (e.g.,  an increase in 
government  purchases)  cannot  shift this labor demand  curve,  since the 
capital stock is predetermined  and the state of technology  is exogenous 
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with respect to such shocks.  Hence if hours and output are to increase, it 
must be through  a shift along this curve,  as shown  in Figure la.  But this 
implies  a reduction  in the real wage.1 
Under standard assumptions  about the aggregate production  technol- 
ogy (an elasticity of substitution  between  capital and labor near one),  the 
1. More complicated  competitive models are considered  in Appendix 1, where we argue 
that the problems discussed are not easily avoided through the assumption  of a more 
complex technology. 
Wt 
H, = n(w,  Al) 
H1  = T7(Wt, t) 
wt  = F(KA', H,; zg) 
(b) 
Ht 
W1  lot 
H,i =  l7(wt,t) 
wI  =  FH((I,  Ht; Zt)//, 
Wi = FH(Kt,Ht; zt)/pt 
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countercyclical  movement  of the  real wage  should  be substantial: one- 
third to one-half  a percent  change  for each  1% variation in output.  But 
such countercyclical real wages  are not observed; indeed,  this embarrass- 
ment to the neoclassical  theory  of labor demand  has been noted  at least 
since  Dunlop  (1938) and  Tarshis (1939). Recent  studies  have  generally 
upheld  this  finding.  In fact, when  correction is made  for bias resulting 
from cyclical variation  in the  composition  of the work  force (there is a 
greater  proportion  of  lower-wage  and  presumably  lower-productivity 
labor hired  during  booms),  many  authors  find  significantly  procyclical 
real  wage  movements  (e.g.,  Stockman,  1986; Kydland  and  Prescott, 
1988; Barsky and Solon,  1989). 
A  number  of  other  objections  may  be  raised  to  the  use  of  data  on 
average  hourly  earnings  as a measure  of the  cost  to firms of marginal 
hours.  Most  of the  corrections  implied  by these  considerations  streng- 
then our argument  as well,  i.e.,  they provide  further reason to conclude 
that the typical cyclical behavior  of wages  is inconsistent  with  the joint 
hypothesis  of competitive  firms and variations  in output  due  to aggre- 
gate demand  variations.  For example,  in the presence  of convex  adjust- 
ment costs  for changes  in the labor input,  (1.1) becomes  instead 
FH(Kt,  Ht; zt) =  Wt  +  4t 
where  4t represents  the adjustment  cost of adding an hour of work.  But 
kt  should  be positive  when  hours  are increasing  (due to current adjust- 
ment costs)  or higher  than they  are expected  to be in the future (due to 
expected  future  adjustment  costs),  and  similarly negative  when  hours 
are decreasing  or lower  than expected  to be in the future. Hence wt +  kt 
should  be even  more  procyclical  than  the real wage  alone,  creating an 
even  greater  problem.  Alternatively,  if  firms  insure  their  workers  by 
smoothing  their  wage  payments,  we  would  expect  that  payments  to 
labor in recessions  should  exceed the social cost of that labor, while labor 
payments  in booms  should  fall short of the social cost.  This too would 
mean  that  the  true  shadow  cost  of an additional  unit  of labor is even 
more procyclical than the measured  real wage. 
Finally, there  is  the  distinction  between  straight  time  and  overtime 
hours.  These  differ  in  two  respects.  First, as  stressed  by  Hansen  and 
Sargent (1988), these  may  not be perfect substitutes  because  the use  of 
overtime  hours  lengthens  the period  over which  capital is utilized.  Sec- 
ond,  as stressed  by Bils (1987), overtime hours command  a higher wage. 
As we  discuss  more  fully  in Appendix  2 and summarize  in Section  4.3 
both of these  matter largely because  overtime  hours rise disproportion- 
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implies  that the marginal product  of overtime  hours declines  sharply in 
booms,  thereby deepening  the puzzle  of why  real wages  do not decline. 
Even  if  they  are  perfect  substitutes,  the  disproportionate  increase  in 
overtime  hours  means  that marginal hours of labor have a higher over- 
time  component  in  booms.  Insofar  as  the  legally  mandated  overtime 
premium  is  allocative,  this  implies  that  the  cost  of  marginal  hours  is 
more procyclical than the average  wage.  Since it is the cost of marginal 
hours that should  be equated  to the marginal product of hours in (1.1), 
this correction also makes  it harder to assign  demand  shocks  an impor- 
tant role in a competitive  model  of fluctuations. 
A second  (though  related)  difficulty  can be expressed  without  refer- 
ence  to  data  on  real wages.  In a competitive  model,  an aggregate  de- 
mand  shock  can produce  an increase in output  and hours only through 
an outward  and downward  shift of the short-run labor supply  curve, as 
in Figure la.  If we assume  a representative  household  (or more properly, 
conditions  under  which  aggregation  is valid) and time-separable prefer- 
ences,  labor supply  in a given  period  can be written in the Frisch form 
Ht =  lr(w, At)  (1.2) 
where  At  represents  the marginal utility of wealth  in period t. Here  r is 
necessarily  increasing  in wt, and assuming  normal goods,  it is increasing 
in At  as well.  Hence  the labor supply  shift shown  in Figure la must result 
from an increase  in the marginal utility of wealth  for the representative 
household. 
This is certainly  a theoretical  possibility;  for example,  an increase  in 
government  purchases  at  time  t could  increase  At, either  through  an 
increase in expected  real rates of return (which would  increase At  for any 
given  expectations  about  the  future  marginal  utility  of  wealth)  or 
through  an  increase  in  the  expected  future  marginal  utility  of  wealth 
(due  to  an  expectation  of  eventual  tax increases).  But it would  imply 
countercyclical  movements of aggregate consumption.2  Again,  under  the as- 
sumption  that both leisure  and consumption  are normal goods,  desired 
leisure  can  fall  (in  the  face  of  a real wage  decline)  only  because  total 
expenditure  (on consumption  and leisure  together)  has fallen.  But that 
should  imply a decline  in consumption  demand  a fortiori (given the real 
wage  decline  as well).  Yet consumption  is clearly procyclical in typical 
aggregate  fluctuations. 
These problems  relate to the competitive  theory of labor demand,  and 
are in fact not much dependent  on assuming  an instantaneously  clearing 
2. See Barro and King (1984) for an early discussion  of this point. Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  * 67 
labor market or neoclassical  labor supply. Suppose  that one has, instead, 
an efficiency wage  model  of the labor market. Equation (1.1) still applies, 
and hence  one  still obtains  the prediction  of a countercyclical real wage. 
Furthermore, a specification  similar to (1.2) still applies as well,  although 
it must  now  be interpreted  as a "quasi-supply  curve" for labor, indicat- 
ing  the  efficiency  wage  as a function  of the  hours  demanded  by firms 
(see,  e.g.,  Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984; Jullien and  Picard,  1989).3 If the 
efficiency  wage  depends  only on the current level  of employment,  then 
there is no  way  that aggregate  demand  shocks  can shift the  efficiency 
wage  locus,  and so no variations in equilibrium employment  and output 
in  response  to  such  shocks  are possible.  If, on  the  other  hand,  as  is 
plausible  in many  efficiency  wage  models,  the efficiency  wage  is lower 
when  households  have a higher marginal utility of wealth,  then a specifi- 
cation  of the  form  (1.2) is obtained.  Aggregate  demand  shocks  can in- 
crease employment  and output  only  insofar as they are associated  with 
increases  in  At, and,  as  before,  this  should  imply  countercyclical  con- 
sumption  demand. 
Alternatively,  if  one  assumes  imperfectly  indexed  wage  contracts, 
with  firms free to choose  their desired  quantity  of hours ex post,  given 
the contractually specified  schedule  of compensation  as a function of the 
hours  demanded,  condition  (1.1) again applies.  Consequently  this type 
of  theory  also  implies  a countercyclical  real wage  (hence  Dunlop  and 
Tarshis' criticism of the General  Theory). 
Other considerations  as well lead us to be unhappy  with the view  that 
aggregate demand  affects equilibrium output and employment  primarily 
through  shifts  in the labor supply  (or quasi-supply)  curve.  For one,  the 
ability of demand  shocks  to affect the marginal utility of wealth  (and so 
to shift the labor supply  curve in Figure la) often depends  on an assump- 
tion  that  the  suppliers  of  labor  participate  in  economywide  financial 
markets.  If, instead,  workers  are liquidity  constrained,  neither  an  in- 
crease in the expected  future marginal utility of wealth nor an increase in 
real rates  of  return  need  imply  an  increase  in  At. Furthermore,  other 
aspects  of the effects of business  cycles on the labor market also suggest 
that the demand  for labor at any given real wage moves  procyclically. For 
instance,  vacancies  are procyclical,  suggesting  that, as in Blanchard and 
Diamond  (1989),  firms  are willing  to  hire  more  workers  at  the  going 
wage  in booms.  Similarly, quits are higher in booms,  suggesting  that the 
increased  employment  at such  times  is not  due  to workers'  having  re- 
laxed their demands  as to the acceptable terms of employment. 
3. If, as in the  papers  cited,  effort is a zero-one  decision  variable,  then  (1.1) still applies, 
where  F represents  output  assuming  that no workers  shirk. Condition  (1.2) represents 
the lowest  wage  consistent  with workers in fact choosing  not to shirk. 68 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
One obvious  response  to these  problems with  a competitive  theory of 
business  cycles  due  to aggregate  demand  variations  is to suppose  that 
aggregate fluctuations  are instead  due mainly to technology  shocks.  This 
has recently become  a popular view. But this solution is subject to impor- 
tant objections.  On the one hand,  it is not obvious  that one sees evidence 
of  the  kind  of  large  variations  in  aggregate  production  possibilities  at 
business  cycle  frequencies  that  are  assumed  in  such  an  explanation 
(Barro and King,  1984; Summers,  1986). The technology  shocks  may be 
inferred from the discrepancy  between  the predictions  of a competitive 
model  with  smooth  technological  progress  and the facts (i.e.,  the puz- 
zles  just  cited,  and  the  related  problem  of the  failure of average  labor 
productivity  to move  countercyclically),  but the absence  of more direct 
evidence  has led to continued  skepticism  about this hypothesis.4 
Furthermore,  if this explanation  were correct, the neoclassical  predic- 
tions should  be observed  to be correct on those  occasions  when  fluctua- 
tions in output  and employment  are largely due to demand  shocks.  For 
example,  if increases  in military purchases  result in increased output and 
employment,  then one  should  see reduced real wages  and reduced con- 
sumption  spending  on those occasions,5 even if real wages and consump- 
tion  are  procyclical  most  of  the  time.  But,  as  is  discussed  further  in 
Section  3, increased  military purchases  appear to stimulate  higher  out- 
put and employment  without  any associated  reduction  of real wages  or 
consumption.6  They also seem  to be accompanied  by increases in vacan- 
cies and quits,  which  is further evidence  for the view  that increases  in 
military purchases  do not affect the labor market only through an effect 
on labor supply. 
An  alternative  explanation  of  the  failure  of  real wages  to  be  coun- 
4. The mere observation  of a procyclical  Solow productivity  residual  need not indicate  the 
existence of technology shocks at business cycle frequencies,  as a number of authors 
have noted (e.g.,  Baxter  and King, 1990; Burnside, Eichenbaum,  and Rebelo, 1990; 
Gordon,  1990;  Hall, 1987,  1988a;  Lucas,  1989;  Rotemberg  and Summers,  1990;  Summers, 
1986). Indeed, Solow (1964) rejected this interpretation.  For evidence that measured 
Solow residuals  do not behave in a way that  appears  to be consistent  with their  interpre- 
tation as exogenous shocks to technology, see in particular  Hall, Baxter  and King, 
Burnside  et al., and Evans (1990). 
5. With  regard  to the latter  prediction,  it should be noted that  even spending on nondurable 
consumer  goods and services should be reduced, at least if one assumes that the utility 
from services from consumer durables is additively separable  from the utility from 
nondurable  consumption and leisure, in which case the above arguments  extend di- 
rectly  to a model with durable  consumer  goods. 
6. Our argument here is parallel  to that of Hall (1987, 1988a),  who rejects  the technology 
shock explanation of procyclical  Solow residuals on the ground that Solow residuals 
also exhibit positive covariance  with variables  such as growth in military  purchases. 
Like Hall, we interpret our findings as evidence of imperfectly  competitive product 
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tercyclical  has  been  discussed  since  the  1930s  (Kalecki,  1938; Keynes, 
1939),  and  recently  revived  as  part of  many  modern  accounts  of  the 
effects of fluctuations  in aggregate  demand.7 In this view, the flaw in the 
above  arguments  is  the  assumption  of  perfectly  competitive  product 
markets.  Instead,  we  will  argue,  not  only  are prices  frequently  above 
marginal cost,  but the  extent  to which  this is true varies over the busi- 
ness  cycle. 
If product  markets are imperfectly  competitive,  (1.1) becomes  instead 
FH(Kt,  Ht; zt)=  tWt  (1.3) 
where  /t  denotes  the desired  markup (ratio of price to marginal cost) in 
period t. If the markup is variable, then,  like the state of technology  z,  it 
becomes  a shift variable for the labor demand  curve. In particular, if for 
some  reason  an  increase  in  aggregate  demand  were  to  result  in  a re- 
duced markup,  the labor demand  curve would  shift up and to the right, 
as shown  in Figure lb.8 This would  make possible  an increase in output 
and  hours  that coincides  with  an increase  in real wages.  Furthermore, 
because  of  the  increase  in  the  real wage,  a reduction  in leisure  could 
coincide  with  an  increase  in  consumption.  Hence  both  of the  puzzles 
cited  above  about  the  effects  of military purchases  could  be explained 
(and the other evidence  suggesting  an effect on labor demand  as well). 
In addition,  such a theory would  reduce the need  to rely on technology 
shocks  as the driving  force behind  typical fluctuations  in aggregate  out- 
put and employment. 
Such a theory also provides  an attractive explanation of certain relative 
price movements  over the business  cycle. Raw materials prices are most 
procyclical,  intermediate  good  prices less  so,  and finished  goods  prices 
least of all. Furthermore, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show  that, 
for  many  industries,  output  prices  move  countercyclically  relative  to 
input  prices.  For technology  shocks  to explain  these  facts,  they  would 
have to be highly  correlated across sectors, which seems implausible.  On 
7. See, e.g., Bils (1987, 1989),  Lindbeck  and Snower (1987),  Phelps (1989),  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford  (1989),  Stiglitz  (1984),  Woodford  (1990),  and Zink (1989).  The shift in empha- 
sis in current theories of nominal rigidity, from an emphasis on wage rigidity to an 
emphasis on price rigidity  (see, e.g., Rotemberg,  1987)  may also be seen as part  of the 
same general tendency, insofar as it directs attention to product  market  imperfections 
rather  than labor market  imperfections  alone, and insofar  as theories of nominal price 
rigidity imply countercyclical  markups (even if the desired markup  is not the crucial 
choice variable  in such models). 
8. In the figure, the labor  supply curve  is not shown to move. This  is not because  a demand 
shock should not in general have some effect on it (again, through  an effect on At).  We 
simply wish to indicate that increases  in output, hours, and the real  wage are possible, 
regardless  of the sign of the effect on At. 70 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
the other hand,  these  facts are consistent  with  simultaneous  reductions 
in  all markups  in  response  to  increases  in  aggregate  demand  (or, as 
below,  in response  to a higher real rate of interest).  This would  result in 
least procyclical prices for goods  that are latest in the production  chain; 
these firms not only reduce their markups but also purchase inputs from 
firms with  reduced  markups,  and so on. 
It remains,  of  course,  to be  explained  how  an increase  in aggregate 
demand  could  in fact result in the reduction in markups needed  for this 
explanation.  We review  three models  of endogenous  markup determina- 
tion in the next section.  Each of them has been discussed  elsewhere;  our 
point  here  is  to  show  how  they  all imply  a common  specification,  ex- 
pressing  the markup as a function  of two aggregate  state variables. The 
functional  relationship  is,  however,  different  in the  three cases.  Given 
this  simple,  common  specification,  we  can estimate  its coefficients  and 
determine  which,  if any, of  these  models  is consistent  with  U.S.  data. 
The three  models  we  review  are the following.  In the first, firms are 
monopolistic  competitors  whose  elasticity  of  demand  depends  on  the 
level  of  sales.  According  to  this  model,  the  markup  is  a function  of 
current aggregate  output  (or perhaps  output  relative  to trend).  In the 
second,  the "customer market" model of Phelps and Winter (1970), firms 
are again  monopolistic  competitors,  but  current  prices  affect  demand 
both  immediately  and  in  the  future.  Pricing  then  involves  a  tradeoff 
between  increasing  market share in the future (by lowering  price now) 
and exploiting  existing  customers  (by raising price now).  As a result, the 
markup now  depends  on  the present  discounted  value  of profits from 
future  sales  as  well  as  on  current  sales.  If the  present  value  of future 
profits is high,  the  firm gains  by reducing  its markup to build  its cus- 
tomer  base.  By contrast,  high  current  demand  relative  to  the  present 
value  of future  profits  raises  the incentive  to exploit  current customers 
by raising the markup. 
In the third model,  firms belong  to oligopolies  that collude  implicitly 
as in Rotemberg  and Saloner (1986). This collusion  is maintained  by the 
threat that reductions  in price,  that would  raise the current profits of a 
deviating  firm,  lead  to  a price  war,  which  reduces  future  profits.  An 
increase  in expected  future profits thus reduces  the incentive  to deviate 
and  allows  the  oligopoly  to  maintain  markups  at  a  higher  level.  By 
contrast,  an increase  in current demand,  relative to this present  value, 
raises the incentive  to deviate,  so the oligopoly  must lower its markup in 
order  to  maintain  discipline.  Hence  in  this  model  the  same  two  state 
variables determine  pricing incentives  as in the customer market model. 
The difference  is that the implicit  collusion  model  asserts  that competi- 
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discounted  value  of  future  profits,  while  the  customer  market  model 
asserts the reverse. 
After introducing  these  models,  we test the empirical adequacy of the 
markup  equations  that  they  imply.  In Section  3,  we  construct  a time 
series  for markup  variations  in the  United  States over  the postwar  pe- 
riod. As  in Bils (1987), this requires  us to make assumptions  about the 
form of  the  production  function,  and  to use  data on  both  output  and 
factors of production  to control for technology  shocks.  Like Bils, we find 
that markups are quite strongly  countercyclical. 
Section 4 is then devoted  to estimating  the relationship between  mark- 
ups,  current  output,  and  the  expected  present  value  of  future  profits 
using  aggregate  U.S.  data.  Because  this  present  value  is hard to mea- 
sure, we  provide  a number of different methods  for estimating  the rela- 
tionship.  Some  of our estimates  rely on Tobin's q, while  others rely only 
on  measures  of  expected  rates  of  return.  Section  5  instead  analyzes 
markup behavior  at a more  disaggregated  level.  We look  both  at time 
series variation of markups  at the two-digit  level,  and at two case stud- 
ies. The advantage  of the case studies  is that both the industry  structure 
and the shocks  that affect markups are clearer. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Models  of Endogenous  Markup  Determination 
Many  models  of possible  effects  of demand  variations  on  the relation- 
ship between  price and marginal cost have been  proposed.9  We narrow 
the scope  of the present  inquiry by considering  only  models  where  de- 
sired markups  depend  on  the  timing  and level  of total demand  but do 
not depend  on  changes  in the  composition  of demand.  This is not the 
only possible  type of theory of variable markups. For example,  as shown 
by Bils (1989) and Lindbeck and Snower  (1987), changes  in the composi- 
tion of demand  can affect the price elasticity of demand perceived by the 
typical firm, thus  changing  its desired  markup. 
We do not pursue  these  ideas  here for two reasons.  First, we wish  to 
preserve  the  traditional  view  that  all increases  in  aggregate  demand, 
whatever  their origin, have the same expansionary  effects. Second,  mod- 
els  where  the  markup  depends  only  on  the  level  of total demand  are 
simpler.  This  simplicity  is  particularly important  when  one  wishes  to 
close  the  models  in  a  complete  general  equilibrium  framework  (as  is 
necessary  for policy simulations  like those  in Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1989). The incorporation  of compositional  shifts would  seem  to require 
additional  state  variables.  For instance,  if the  poor  and  the  rich have 
9. Stiglitz (1984) surveys  a number of these. 72 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
different demand functions and their relative  importance  in sales varies 
over the cycle, the income distribution must be represented by state 
variables. Similarly,  if durables replacement purchases have different 
characteristics  than "upgrade"  purchases, the evolution of the stock of 
durables  would have to be modeled explicitly. 
2.1 THE  BASIC  SETUP 
We consider economies with many symmetric  firms. We focus on sym- 
metric  equilibria,  so that in equilibrium  all firms  charge  the same price  at 
time t, Pt. For simplicity we treat the output of these symmetric  firms as 
the numeraire  so that, in units of the numeraire,  Pt  is one. 
These symmetric firms have access to a technology of the form 
y; = F[K, z,(Ht  -  Ht)]  (2.1) 
where y;, Ht, and K;  represent, respectively,  firm i's output, labor  input, 
and capital  input at time t. The variable  z, represents  the state of technol- 
ogy at time t, so that a higher z corresponds  to a more productive  period, 
while Ht  is the amount of labor  devoted to fixed costs. The allowance for 
an overhead labor requirement  is a way of introducing  decreasing  aver- 
age costs, of the kind needed to reconcile an assumed markup  of price 
over marginal  cost with the apparent  absence of significant  pure profits 
in U.S. industry.10 
Each firm has access to competitive markets  for labor  and capital ser- 
vices. At time t, firm  i must pay a wage wt  for  each unit of labor  and it must 
pay rt  for each unit of capital  that it rents. Assuming F is homogeneous of 
degree one and competitive factor  markets,  marginal  cost at t is indepen- 
dent of the number of units that the firm produces and is equal to 
min wh + rtk  s.t.  F(k,  zth)  = 1.  (2.2) 
h,k 
The assumption that F is homogeneous of degree one so that marginal 
cost is constant is not essential for the models to be presented below. 
However, it simplifies our analysis by allowing us to write the ratio of 
two firms' prices as the ratio of their respective markups.  We denote the 
equilibrium markup by  /t;  this is  the equilibrium ratio of the price 
charged by all firms to marginal  cost. Since both wt and rt are denomi- 
nated in the units of the typical firm's output, marginal  cost in (2.2) is 
simply equal to l/llt. Letting firm i's ratio of price to marginal  cost be 
10. For evidence  on  the  existence  of increasing  returns,  in the  sense  of average  costs  in 
excess  of marginal cost on average,  in U.S.  industry, see Hall (1987). Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  * 73 
denoted  by  t',  firm  i's  profits  gross  of  fixed  costs  in  units  of  the 
numeraire are equal to 
1 
y't.  (2.3) 
In a symmetric  equilibrium all firms charge the same price and sell the 
same quantity Yt.  This is related to the aggregate level of sales Yt  through 
the relation 
Yt =  nItY 
where  It denotes  the number  of industries  in period t and n the number 
of firms per industry.  (In the case of a monopolistic  competition  model,  n 
equals  one  and  It is  the  number  of  differentiated  goods  produced  in 
period  t.) It is assumed  that I, grows  deterministically  at a constant rate, 
It+1/It  =  y,  where  y  -  1.11  This growth  in the variety of goods  produced 
can be  one  source  of  growth  in  the  aggregate  overhead  labor require- 
ment.  We furthermore  assume  that goods  may disappear  from produc- 
tion; each industry  in existence  in period t is assumed  to have a probabil- 
ity a of existence  in period t +  1, where  0 <  a c  1, with the probabilities 
of disappearance  being independent  across industries  and over time. 
Within  symmetric  equilibria,  we  denote  by  xt each  firm's  expected 
present  discounted  value  at t of  the  stream  of individual  profits  from 
period t +  1 onward 
x=  E E  (+i 
- 
1Yt)  (2.4) 
j=  qt  i-'t+j 
Here Et takes expectations  conditional  on information available at t, and 
qt+/lqt  is the stochastic  variable such that any random yield z,t+ (in units of 
period t + j goods)  has a present  discounted  value in period t of Et(qt+jzt+j/ 
qt). The expectational  variable xt is of critical importance  in both  of the 
"dynamic" models  of markup determination  below. 
We now  distinguish  among  three models  that differ in both the specifi- 
cation of demand  and of market structure. 
11. The variable I, takes continuous rather than integral values. In fact, we assume a 
continuum of industries, so that each has a negligible  effect on factor  markets  and on 
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2.2 THE  STATIC  MONOPOLISTIC  COMPETITION  MODEL 
In this model  each firm behaves  like a monopolistic  competitor in that it 
takes as given  the prices of all other firms, the level of marginal cost, and 
the  level  of  aggregate  demand.  As  in  the  "symmetric"  monopolistic 
competition  model  of Dixit and  Stiglitz  (1977), we  assume  that the  de- 
mand  for firm i depends  on  the  ratio of its  price to  the  average  price 
charged by all other firms. Equivalently, firm i's demand  at t depends  on 
the ratio of its own markup /4 to the markup charged by all other firms in 
the  symmetric  equilibrium  we  will  consider,  lt.  Thus we  write  firm i's 
demand  as 
y=D  (,)  (2.5) 
where  the  firm's  demand  depends  on  aggregate  demand  through  the 
average level  of sales  Yt. To preserve  symmetry  we  require that the de- 
mand for each firm be equal to y if they all charge the same price. Thus 
we  require that D(l,y)  =  y.  A special  case to which  we  will return has 
homothetic  preferences  so  that demand  is the product  of a function  of 
relative prices and average demand Yt.  In this special case both D and the 
partial derivative  of D with respect to relative prices, D1, are proportional 
toy. 
Since  the  firm's problem  is  static we  can obtain  its  decision  rule by 
substituting  (2.5)  into  (2.3)  and  maximizing  with  respect  to  /g.  This 
yields  the familiar formula 
'i-  1 
D +  DI =  0.  (2.6) 
/.t 
In a symmetric equilibrium all firms charge the same markup, so that the 
markup can rise if and only if -Dj(l,y)/D(l,y)  =  -D1/y,  the elasticity of 
demand  evaluated  at the point where  all prices are the same,  falls. Thus 
the markup can rise with a change  in Yt  if and only if preferences  are not 
homothetic  (as in Robinson,  1932). There is little a priori reason to expect 
either direction  of deviation  from homotheticity,  so that markups  seem 
as likely to rise with increased  sales as to fall. 
The nonhomothetic  case has two disadvantages  relative to the homo- 
thetic  case.  First, it leads  the  markup  to be  nonstationary  if output  is 
itself  nonstationary.  The  existence  of  nonstationary  markups  would 
seem  to  demand  more  explicit  modeling  of  the  dynamic  evolution  of 
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the existence  of nonstationary  markups  would  considerably  complicate 
our computation  of  markup  variations.  That computation  is based  on 
approximating  the  behavioral  equations  around  the  constant  value  of 
the  markup  in  the  economy's  deterministic  steady-state  growth  path. 
Computations  of this type  are much  more complicated  if the markup is 
nonstationary. 
A possible  alternative  view  (and the main reason for our considering 
the nonhomothetic  case  in our estimates  below)  is that the elasticity of 
demand  really depends  not on Yt  but on the deviation  of Yt  from its trend 
path.  This  would  allow  stationary  fluctuations  in  the  markup,  and 
would  justify  the  log-linear  specifications  used  in our empirical work. 
The  theoretical  interpretation  of  such  a specification,  however,  would 
probably have  to rely on cyclical changes  in the composition  of demand 
(for which  the  deviation  of  output  from  trend  would  be  a proxy),  in 
which  case  a more  adequate  analysis  should  specify  those  changes  in 
composition  explicitly. 
The second  disadvantage  of the nonhomothetic  case is that aggregation 
of demand  across  different  types  of purchasers  (consumers,  firms, and 
the government)  becomes  more difficult; similarly, the use of a representa- 
tive consumer  to model  private consumption  demand becomes  problem- 
atic. In the nonhomothetic  case,  the composition  of demand  must itself 
matter since the elasticity of demand  depends  on the level of each type of 
spending  instead of depending  on the overall level of spending.  Yet, as we 
explained  earlier, models  where  the composition  of demand  matters are 
inherently  more  complicated  and  possibly  unsatisfactory  in  their 
implications. 
2.3 THE  CUSTOMER  MARKET  MODEL 
The  customer  market  model  is based  on  Phelps  and  Winter  (1970). It 
continues  to  have  each  firm  maximizing  profits  with  respect  to  its 
markup taking  the markup in all other firms as given.  It differs in that 
demand  has a dynamic  pattern.  A firm that lowers  its current price not 
only  sells  more to its existing  customers,  but also expands  its customer 
base. Having a larger customer base leads future sales to be higher at any 
given  price.  One  simple  formulation  that  captures  this  idea  involves 
writing the demand  for firm i at time t as 
Yt =  7  , Yt  m  ,  1 <  0,  7(l,y)  =  y.  (2.7) 
At 
In the homothetic  case,  once  again,  q7  and rl  are proportional  to y. The 
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charges  the same  price as all other firms. The market share mi depends 
on past pricing behavior  according to the rule 
mt+,=  mt  8' <0,  g(l)  =  1  (2.8) 
so that a temporary reduction  in price raises firm i's market share perma- 
nently.  Equations  (2.6)  and  (2.7) are intended  to capture  the  idea  that 
customers  have  switching  costs,  in a manner analogous  to the models  of 
Gottfries  (1986), Klemperer  (1987), and  Farrell and  Shapiro  (1988).12  A 
reduction  in  price  attracts  new  customers  who  are  then  reluctant  to 
change  firms for fear of having  to pay these  switching  costs.  One obvi- 
ous  implication  of  (2.6)  and  (2.7) is  that  the  long-run  elasticity  of  de- 
mand,  i.e.,  the response  of eventual  demand  to a permanent  increase in 
price,  is larger than  the  short-run  elasticity  of demand.  In our case,  a 
firm that charges  a higher  price than its competitors  eventually  loses  all 
its customers,  though  this is not essential  for our analysis. 
The firm's expected  present  discounted  value of profits from period  t 
onward  is thus 
jY  .Wt+Z  {^?  \  .H  /-  ^Q^  E  Eti  ( (i  n  , Yt+ ) mt  -g (  )  (2.9) 
j=0  qt  At+j  t+/  z=0  't+z 
Firm i  chooses  {(}t  to  maximize  (2.9),  taking  as  given  the  stochastic 
processes  {/t}  and {yt.  Therefore 
q  A(-,  Yt  +  q  (,  Yt  +  )[  ]+Et  E 
At  At  At  At  j=1  qt 
1[i  ]  (  t+Y+,  )jjg  tr)  =0  (2.10) 
L  t +j  [Lt+j  z=1  [dt+z 
where  subscripts  denote  partial derivatives.  At a symmetric equilibrium 
where  all firms charge the same price, each has a share m' equal to one, 
and g equals one in all periods.  So the expectation  term in (2.10) is equal 
to the common  present  discounted  value of future profits given by (2.4). 
Therefore,  (2.10) gives  the markup /t  as 
12. This idea has been used in general equilibrium  macroeconomic  models by Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1988), Phelps (1989), and Gottfries (1990). It has been applied to the 
analysis of international  pricing issues by Gottfries  (1988)  and Froot and Klemperer 
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//1(1, Yt) 
^t  =  ^UX,,  yni  .t  (2.11)  t  =  (x,  Yt +  ml(1, Yt) +  g'(1)Xt 
Because  71  and g'(1) are both negative,  the derivative of ,u with respect 
to x is negative.  An increase in x means  that profits from future custom- 
ers  are high  so  that  each  firm lowers  its  price in order to increase  its 
market share.  The effect  of current sales  Yt  on the markup is more am- 
biguous.  In  the  homothetic  case  where  1q is  proportional  to y,  (2.11) 
implies  that the markup depends  only on the ratio xt/yt; the elasticity of 
the markup with respect to y is equal to the negative  of the elasticity with 
respect  to x.  A high  value  of y means  that current customers  are rela- 
tively  profitable  so  that,  in the  homothetic  case,  raising prices  and  ex- 
ploiting  existing  customers  are relatively  attractive. This intuition  must 
be  modified  when  the  elasticity  of  demand  facing  an  individual  firm 
depends  on  the  level  of  sales.  Differentiating  (2.11) and  ignoring  time 
subscripts,  the derivative  of ui  with  respect to y is 
-  t  +  (1  - 
,)12 
y +  n7(1, y) + g'(1)x 
which  is positive  in the homothetic  case where  j12, the second  partial of 
r1  with respect to relative prices and y, equals q71/y.  This derivative can be 
negative  if  q12 is smaller so that demand  becomes  more elastic as output 
rises. 
Put broadly, Equation (2.11) says that lower prices are a form of invest- 
ment,  an investment  in market share.  Such an investment  is attractive 
when  the  present  discounted  value  of the  future  returns  from invest- 
ment  (x) are  high  relative  to  its  cost,  which  depends  on  the  level  of 
current  sales  (y).  Hence,  a  new  variable  (x)  affects  the  equilibrium 
markup. This can be thought  of in terms somewhat  similar to those used 
in the case of the  static model.  Because  the long-run  elasticity is higher 
than the  short-run  elasticity, conditions  that lead firms to be more con- 
cerned about future sales (high x for a given y) mean that they effectively 
face a more elastic demand  curve. They thus lower their markups. 
2.4 THE  IMPLICIT  COLLUSION  MODEL 
The model  in this section  is a simplified  presentation  of Rotemberg and 
Woodford  (1989). We consider  an economy  with  many industries,  each 
of which  consists  of n firms. The n firms in each industry collude implic- 
itly in the sense  that there is no enforceable  cartel contract, but only an 
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ing  will  be  punished.  On  the  other  hand,  the  firms in  each  industry, 
even  when  acting  in concert,  take other industries'  prices,  the level  of 
aggregate  demand,  and the level  of marginal cost as given.  Abusing  the 
language  somewhat,  we  can view  industries  as monopolistic  competi- 
tors  in  the  usual  sense,  while  the  firms  within  each  industry  collude 
implicitly. 
Keeping  this  distinction  in mind,  we  write  the  demand  for firm i in 
industry j as 
y=D  -,  ...,-,yt  ,  D'(,  ...,,)  =  y.  (2.12) 
[/t  #'t 
The function  Di is symmetric  in its first n arguments  except the ith, and 
the  functions  Di (for i  =  1, ... .  ,  n) are all the  same  after appropriate 
permutation  of the arguments.  Using  (2.3), profits for firm i in industry j 
when  all other firms in industry j charge the markup ,/{, while  firms in 
other industries  all charge At, equal 
?tj  -  D1 (  ..  ,...,-y  .  (2.13) 
A  t  yt  't  /t 
If each firm existed  for only one period,  it would  maximize  (2.13) with 
respect  to  its  own  markup  treating  the  markups  of  all other  firms as 
given.  The resulting  Bertrand equilibrium in the industry  would  have a 
markup equal to ,B(p/t,  Yt). If the firms in an industry charged more than 
B(A,t, Yt), individual  firms would  benefit  from undercutting  the indus- 
try's  price.  Higher  prices,  with  their  attendant  higher  profits,  can  be 
sustained  as  a subgame  perfect  equilibrium  only  if deviators  are pun- 
ished  after a deviation.  If firms interact repeatedly  and have  an infinite 
horizon,  there  are many  equilibria of  this  type  and  these  differ in the 
price that is charged in equilibrium. 
We assume  that firms succeed  in implementing  that symmetric equilib- 
rium that is jointly best for them.  That is, their implicit agreement  maxi- 
mizes  the  present  discounted  value  of expected  equilibrium  profits for 
each firm in industry  j,  taking as given  the stochastic  processes  for {/ut} 
and {y,t. As shown  by Abreu (1986), the punishment  for any deviation  is 
as severe  as possible  in the optimal symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, a 
deviating  firm sets price to maximize current period profits 17.  The result 
is that the single  period  profits of a deviating  firm equal 
-..  1 
.  .. 
7dt=max7  ui(t  1  ..',Yt  ?y)  (2.14) 
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After any deviation,  the firms in the industry  punish  the deviator to the 
maximum  possible  extent.  Because  of the possibility  of exit, the volun- 
tary participation  of the firm that is being punished  precludes  it earning 
an  expected  present  value  lower  than  zero  after a deviation.  We give 
conditions  that ensure  that a deviator indeed  earns a present  discounted 
value of zero in Rotemberg  and Woodford (1989).13 
Let xl denote,  by  analogy  to  (2.3),  the  expected  present  discounted 
value  of  the  profits  that  each  firm in  industry  j  can expect  to  earn in 
subsequent  periods  if  there  are  no  deviations.  Then,  if  the  expected 
present  value  of profits after a deviation  equals zero,  firms in industry j 
will not deviate  as long  as 
J  <t  C  t  +  Xt  (2.15) 
where  7rt  is the  value  of  i7t  when  firm i charges  the  same  price as the 
other  firms  in  its  industry.  We consider  the  case  where  the  incentive 
compatibility  constraint  (2.15) is always  binding.'4 
At a symmetric  equilibrium,  all industries  have  the same markup,  so 
that each firm sells Yt  and x] equals xt. Using  D(p, y) to denote  D'(1, .... 
p,.  ,  1, y), we  then have from (2.13)-(2.15) 
max [  p  -  D(,  t)  1---  yt + xt  (216)  p  At  At 
where p represents  the relative price chosen  by the deviating  firm. Equa- 
tion  (2.16) can be  solved  for /t,  yielding  once  again  ,t  =  /,(xt,  Yt). The 
13. The main condition requires  that there exist a ,u smaller  than one such that when all 
firms in industry  j charge a markup  of ,  while the firms in other industries  charge  a 
markup  greater  than or equal to one, a deviating  firm  cannot  sell positive quantities  by 
charging  a price in excess of marginal  cost. This assumption requires  that the goods 
produced by firms in the industry be relatively  good substitutes. It ensures that the 
deviating firm cannot make positive profits in the periods following a deviation by 
deviating  from the behavior  it is expected to follow after  the deviation. 
14. In Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1989)  we give conditions under which a deterministic 
steady state exists in which (2.15) is always binding. We also show that, for small 
enough stochastic shocks, there continues to exist a perturbed  equilibrium  in which 
(2.15)  always binds. This case is clearly  most plausible  if xJ  is not too large  a multiple  of 
a single period's  profits,  which is to say if a is considerably  less than one. In the present 
case, we need not interpret  a low value of a as referring  to rapid disappearance  of 
goods from the market;  instead, it might be taken to indicate  a limit on the ability  of 
firms  to punish their competitors  for past undercutting.  For  example,  we may suppose 
that in each period there is a probability  a that the previous  collusive  agreement  will be 
played, including  punishment  if the previous  agreement  calls  for  it, but also a probabil- 
ity 1 -  a that a new collusive agreement will be negotiated, in which case the prior 
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relevant solution  of (2.16) is the one where  pt exceeds  the Bertrand level, 
so that deviators  undercut  the equilibrium  price and p is less  than one. 
Denoting  by ,ix the derivative  of ,  with respect to X, (2.16) yields 
2 
ix  (2.17) 
D(p, y) -  y 
Since p is less  than  one,  D(p, y)  >  D(1,  y)  =  y and  /Lx  is positive.  An 
increase  in x,  which  raises  the cost  of deviating,  raises the equilibrium 
markup.  Such  an increase  in  the  markup  is necessary  to maintain  the 
equality between  the costs and the benefits  of deviating. 
We can also bound  the response  of the markup to changes  in x from 
above.  In particular 
OL(  -  1) 
x =(p  -  1/,)D(p,y)  -  (1 -  1/,)y  <  (1 -  1/L)[D(p, y) -  y] = 
Irx 
(2.18) 
where  the  first equality  follows  from (2.16),  the inequality  from p <  1, 
and  the  last  equality  from  (2.17).  Therefore,  the  elasticity  of  ,u with 
respect to x, while  positive,  is smaller than ,  -  1. 
The  effects  of  changes  in y are more  ambiguous.  In the  homothetic 
case, where  Dy = D/y for all prices, (2.16) implies that ,  depends  only on 
the ratio x/y.  Thus an increase  in y raises the benefits  to deviating  now 
and the markup falls. More generally,  uy is negative  as long as increases 
in y raise the left-hand  side of (2.16) more than they raise the right-hand 
side.  This occurs as long as 
d(gL, y)D2(p,  Y) > .(',  Y! 
D(p, y)  y 
While  this  must  hold  in the  homothetic  case where  D2/D equals  1/y, it 
could fail more generally  if yD2/D is sufficiently  less  than one for p <  1. 
This quantity is increasing  in p only if the elasticity of demand faced by a 
deviating  firm,  -pDj(p,  y)/D(p,  y),  is  a  decreasing  function  of  y.  For 
goods  that are close  substitutes,  the optimal deviating  p is only  slightly 
less than one,  even  though  Trd  is much larger than lr. Since yD2(1, y)/D(1, 
y) = 1, it seems  likely that yD2/D is not much smaller than one,  so that ly 
>  0 is implausible  in this model. 
We consider  small  deviations  of  the  markup,  output  and  x around 
their trend  values.  Variables that are hatted,  for example  |t,  will  thus Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  *  81 
denote  the logarithmic deviation  at t of the markup around its trend. The 
three models  we  have  considered  then imply that 
,t =  ext  -  EyYt.  (2.19) 
Where the theories  differ is in their implications  for the elasticities Ex  and 
Ey.  These  implications  can be summarized  as follows: 
General  case  Homothetic  case 
Static  Ex = 0  EX =  y = 0 
Customer  market  EX <  0  EX  =  Ey  <  0 
Implicit collusion  0 <  Ex <  /  -  1  0 <  E  =  Ey  <  ,  -  1 
i  ii  i  iiiiiiii  i i  i  iiiii  iiiiiiii  ii  i  i  i  i  iii iii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Note that the predictions  of the three models  about the possible  parame- 
ter values  are  all  mutually  inconsistent  (especially  in  the  homothetic 
case).  Hence  estimation  of  these  elasticities  allows  us  to  discriminate 
among  the three models. 
Finally, note that in (2.19) we  can interpret Yt  as the logarithmic devia- 
tion of aggregate  output  Yt, and similarly xt as the logarithmic deviation 
of aggregate  profit expectations  Xt, where  Xt = nIxt, or 
Xt=  E  t  )i+i  (  t+j -  1  -  (2.20) 
j=l  y  q9t  \  t+j 
These  are the  variables  in  terms  of  which  we  work  in  our analysis  of 
aggregate  U.S.  data below. 
An alternative to the methods  pursued  there, where we try to ascertain 
how markups vary with x and 9, is to analyze the response  of the economy 
to a change  in aggregate  demand.  These changes  are akin to exogenous 
changes  in demand  because,  for the United  States,  changes  in military 
purchases  are arguably due  either to break-outs  of hostilities  in foreign 
countries  (World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War) 
or  to  exogenous  changes  in  attitudes  toward  defense  (the  Reagan 
buildup).  They  also  ought  to be independent  of changes  in the private 
sector's ability to convert inputs  into final output.  Therefore, any shift in 
labor demand  that they induce  ought  to be due to markup variation. 
Such  an  analysis  is  contained  in  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1989) 
where we study  the economy's  response  to changes  in military expendi- 
tures.  We  find  that  an  increase  in  national  defense  purchases  raises 82 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
output  produced  by  the  private  sector  (as in Garcia-Mila, 1987), raises 
that sector's productivity  (as in Hall, 1988a), and, most important for our 
purposes,  raises  real product  wages  paid in the private sector. We find 
that  this  is  true  using  both  quarterly  post-War data  and  annual  data 
starting in  1890. We now  inquire  which,  if any, of the  models  we  con- 
sider are consistent  with  these  increased  real wages. 
Consider  first the static model,  which  makes the markup a function of 
the level  of output.  Since the markup  u is only a function of Y, (1.3) can 
be replaced by 
FH(K,,  HI, zt) =  A(K,,  Ht, z,)wt. 
This describes  a relationship  between  Ht and wt that depends  only on Kt 
and  zt, so  that  it cannot  be  affected  by  aggregate  demand.  Aggregate 
demand  can affect employment  only by shifting  labor supply.  Increases 
in  real  wages  following  increases  in  aggregate  demand  could  still be 
consistent  with  this story if the derivative  of  L  with respect to Y were so 
large  that  the  labor  demand  curve  sloped  upward.  As  is  discussed 
above,  this is possible  only by having large, and problematic, departures 
from  homothetic  demand.  Moreover,  such  a  story  seems  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  the  increases  in  vacancies  and  quits  that are shown  by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1989) to accompany  increases in military pur- 
chases.  These  too suggest  increases  in labor demand. 
Consider  next the customer  market model.  In this model,  increases in 
military purchases  affect the markup insofar as they affect expected rates 
of return or the  relationship  between  current and expected  future out- 
put. From a theoretical viewpoint,  we would  expect increases in military 
purchases  to  raise  the  rate of  return.  This  is  also  consistent  with  the 
evidence  in  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1989). An  increase  in  rates  of 
return should  raise markups in the customer market model,  thus leading 
to a fall in labor demand.  This is precisely  the sort of paradoxical (and 
unappealing)  result presented  by Phelps  (1989). 
Finally, consider  the  implicit  collusion  model.  In this model,  the  in- 
creases  in rates of return lower  equilibrium  markups  and raise the de- 
mand  for labor. That model  is thus  consistent  with  the qualitative  fea- 
tures of the empirical responses.  Its quantitative fit is discussed  at more 
length  in Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1989). 
A different form of evidence  on these  models  can be obtained if one is 
willing  to make  more  precise  assumptions  about production  functions. 
In this case,  one  can construct  markup series that one can confront with 
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3. Construction  of  a Time  Series  for  Markup  Variations 
3.1 METHOD 
We assume  (as in the theoretical  models  discussed  above) an aggregate 
production  function  of the form (2.1).15  As in (1.3), the markup of price 
over marginal cost is then 
FH[Kt,  zt(Ht -  Ht)] 
~t =  (3.1) 
Wt 
We can thus  construct  a markup  series  from aggregate  time  series  for 
output,  factor inputs,  and real wages,  given  a quantitative  specification 
of the production  function  F (including  a value for Ht), and given  a time 
series  for the  productivity  shocks  {zt}. The productivity  shocks  present 
an obvious  difficulty,  since  they are not directly observed.  In our previ- 
ous paper (Rotemberg and Woodford,  1989), we measured  the effects of 
a particular type of aggregate  demand  shock on the markup by choosing 
a shock  (innovations  in real military purchases)  that could be argued  to 
be uncorrelated  with  variations  in {zt}. This will not,  however,  suffice if 
we  wish  to construct  a time  series  for cyclical variations in the markup 
over the entire postwar  period.  Here we  propose  instead  to construct a 
series  for {zj  from  (2.1),  using  what  is  essentially  the  familiar Solow 
(1957) method,  corrected for the presence  of imperfect competition  and 
increasing  returns to scale.16 
We consider  a log-linear  approximation  to (2.1) around  a steady-state 
growth path along which  Ht grows  at the same rate as Ht, while Kt  and Yt 
grow at the same rate as ztHt.17  This approximation  yields 
15. Our results are little affected by the choice of the functional  form (2.1) over the form 
(5.1) used in the analysis of sectoral  data below. By contrast,  the assumed size of the 
fixed costs in relation to total costs (or more generally,  of average cost in relation  to 
marginal cost), represented here by the average size of H/H,, is important to our 
conclusions. 
16. Bils (1987)  avoids the need to construct  a series for {zj by assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
production  function with no overhead requirement  (at least for production  hours) so 
that FH  in (3.1) can be replaced  by aYt/Ht.  We show that this restrictive  functional  form 
is not necessary,  and are able to consider  the consequences  of alternative  assumptions 
regarding  factor  substitutability  and the size of fixed costs. 
17. The assumption  that the overhead  labor  requirement  grows at a constant  rate  allows us 
to obtain  a stationary  equilibrium  with growth (in which, among other  things, the ratio 
of fixed costs to total costs fluctuates  around a constant value). This could be due to 
growth in the variety of goods produced as the economy grows, although we do not 
impose such an interpretation.  We  could have assumed instead that the overhead  labor 
requirement  is constant  in per capita  terms. Because  per capita  hours  appear  stationary, 
this too would have allowed us to apply our techniques. 84  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
t( 
F,K 
)kt  +zF2(  H  )  [)]  (3.2)  yt  k  - 
^  +  z  +  -  nt\  (3.2) 
Y  Y  H -H 
where  hatted  lower  case  variables  refer to  log  deviations  from  trend 
values,  and where  the other expressions  represent  constant  coefficients 
evaluated  at the steady-state  growth  path. 
We assume  that, for both factors, the marginal product equals ,AL*  times 
the factor price in the steady-state  growth  path, where  A* is the steady- 
state markup. Therefore, F1KIY  and zF2H/Y  are, respectively, equal to  L,*SK 
and A*SH, where  sK and SH  are payments  to capital and labor as a share of 
output's  value.  Because  F is homogeneous  of degree  one,  Euler's equa- 
tion implies  that 
H-H 
A*  SK  +/x*SH  *=1.  (3.3) 
H 
Using  (3.3), (3.2) can be written  as 
Zt  (3.4) 
1  - l,*SK 
This  allows  us  to  construct  a  time  series  for Zt from  the  variations  in 
detrended  output  and  factor inputs,  given  average  factor shares,  and 
given  a value  for the  single  free parameter ,C*. This parameter is set to 
one in Solow's  original method.18 
Assuming  that wt and z, have  the same trend growth rates, the analo- 
gous  log-linear  approximation  of (3.1) yields 
t  =  Zt-t  s- w t  t  (3.5) 
e  1 -  )  /S 
where  e represents  the elasticity of substitution  between  the two factors 
in F, evaluated  at the factor ratio associated  with the steady-state  growth 
path. Substituting  (3.4) for Zt this becomes 
e -  A s,  (1 -e)isK  A  Hs, 
=  tSK Y  +  (t  -,  -  t-  t  (3.6)  e -e  e  e-  e,*sK  1 -  l  SK 
18. Technically, Solow's  calculation also differs from (3.4) in allowing  the factor shares to be 
time-varying.  This amounts  to preserving  some  higher-order terms in the Taylor series 
expansion  of (2.1), but there is then little reason to drop other second-order  terms. We 
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Hence  we  need  to specify  only the parameters e and ,*  in addition  to 
the observable  factor shares  to construct  our markup series.  Assigning 
numerical  values  to e and  ,*  is admittedly  somewhat  problematic.  Our 
basic  strategy  is  to  determine  ranges  of  plausible  values,  and  then  to 
check the  degree  to which  our results  are sensitive  to the  exact values 
chosen  for e and ,*  within  those  ranges.  The parameter e is often  "cali- 
brated" in real business  cycle studies  on the basis of observed  long-run 
trends.  The absence  of a significant trend in factor shares, in the face of a 
significant  trend in relative  factor prices  over the last century, is some- 
times  taken to indicate  an elasticity  of substitution  near one.  But this is 
not  a particularly  persuasive  justification.  First, this  fact might  simply 
indicate that most technical progress is labor augmenting,  as assumed  in 
(2.1), rather than a long-run  elasticity of one. 
Second,  there  need  not  be  much  relationship  between  the  long-run 
elasticity and the short-run elasticity (relevant for our purposes).  On the 
one hand, if one assumes  a "putty-clay" technology,  the short-run elastic- 
ity of substitution  might  be much  less  than  that indicated  by long-run 
trends.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  cyclical variations  in capital utilization 
might make the relevant  short-run elasticity even  greater than the long- 
run elasticity. 
As  is discussed  in Appendix  1, when  utilization  varies,  the relevant 
production  function  for short-term  analysis  is the  reduced  form (A.4). 
Thus, in the above  calculations,  e is the elasticity associated  with F. But, 
in the long run, utilization  may well be constant.  In this case, the elastic- 
ity one  would  infer from growth  observations  would  be that associated 
with  the production  function  in (A.1),  F, evaluated  at constant  u. Then 
the measured  long-run  elasticity  of substitution  would  be smaller than 
the  relevant  short-run  elasticity.  We must  thus  admit  that the  relevant 
elasticity is not easily measured.  We take as our baseline  case the value e 
-  1 (Cobb-Douglas),  the  value  most  often  used  in real business  cycle 
studies,  but we  also consider  the possibilities  e = 0.5 and e = 2. 
We are similarly unable to directly observe  Au*.  Hall (1988a) proposes  to 
measure it on the basis that the Zt  series given by (3.4) should be orthogo- 
nal to changes  in variables such as real military purchases  or the party of 
the President.  Hall uses  value added  as his measure of output and finds 
values  above  1.8  for  all  seven  of  his  one-digit  industries.  Domowitz, 
Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988)  use  gross  output  instead  and  obtain 
smaller  estimates  of  ,*  for  most  industries;  a  value  of  around  1.6  is 
typical of their findings.  These smaller estimates  do not contradict Hall's 
findings.  In an industry  that uses  materials  inputs,  the  markup calcu- 
lated  using  the  value  added  data,  VA,  exceeds  the  markup  calculated 86 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
using gross output  data, AGo.  If materials inputs vary proportionally with 
gross output,  the theoretical  relationship  is 




where  sM represents  the share of materials in the value of gross output. 
When  we  study  aggregate  data,  we  find  it more  convenient  to  use 
value-added  data  so  that  the  estimates  of  Domowitz,  Hubbard,  and 
Petersen  (1988) would  have to be adjusted  upward  to be appropriate for 
our  analysis.19 Nonetheless,  we  take  1.6  as  our  baseline  case  for  the 
aggregate  data,  but also  consider  the value  2. As some  readers may be 
skeptical about the existence  of markups even  as high as 60%, we  pres- 
ent  some  results  for a markup  variation  series  constructed  under  the 
assumption  u* =  1.2, although  we regard this as an extremely conserva- 
tive choice. 
3.2 AGGREGATE  DATA 
Our time series for Tobin's q comes from Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 
(1990). Our measure  of the output  (value added)  of the private sector is 
obtained  from the  NIPA as the  difference  between  GNP and  the value 
added  by  the  Federal,  State,  and  local governments.  Our index  of the 
prices of goods  is the ratio of nominal  to real private value  added.  Our 
measure of private hours is obtained from the establishment  survey as the 
difference between  total hours in nonagricultural payrolls and hours em- 
ployed  by  the  government.  These  hours  do not  have  exactly the  same 
coverage as our output  series. Thus, for our measures  to be strictly accu- 
rate, the percentage  changes  in agricultural hours must equal the percent- 
age changes  in the hours  of private nonagricultural establishments. 
We employ  two measures  of wages.  The principal one is a measure of 
hourly compensation.  This measure  equals private employee  compensa- 
tion from the NIPA (i.e.,  total compensation  minus government  compen- 
sation) over our measure of private hours. The second measure is average 
hourly  earnings  in manufacturing.  One advantage  of the compensation 
series is that it has a larger coverage  both in terms of the sectors whose 
payments  are recorded and in terms of the forms of compensation  that are 
included.20 
19. Other industry  studies  using  gross  output  data,  such  as Morrison (1990), find some- 
what lower values  for  AGO, ranging between  1.2 and 1.4. Assuming  a typical materials 
share of 0.5 these  correspond  to AF  ranging between  1.5 and 2.3. 
20. A  second  advantage  is  that  there  is  reason  to  believe  the  compensation  series  has 
smaller measurement  error, at least in the way we use it. We use the real wage  only to Markups  and the Business Cycle *  87 
Figure 2 DEVIATIONS FROM TREND OF HOURS AND THE MARKUP 
(e =  1, /*  =  1.6) 
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3.3 BASIC PATTERNS  IN THE AGGREGATE  DATA 
Figures  2,  3,  and  4  illustrate  the  constructed  series  for  the  logarithmic 
deviation  of  the  markup  from  trend  over  the  postwar  period,  under 
different  assumptions  regarding  ,*  and  e.  These  are  constructed  by  ig- 
noring  the  departures  of  capital  from  trend,  k.  Because  we  make  an 
construct  our series on markups.  Ignoring  fluctuations  in capital,  Equation  (3.6) gives 
the detrended markups  as a function of the detrended levels of output, 9Y,  hours, ft,, 
and the real wage, zbt.  A simple transformation  allows one to write the detrended 
markups  as  a function  of  the  detrended  labor share  (SHt =  zbt  +  /t  -  t),  detrended 
output and detrended hours. The use of the two different  wage series is thus equiva- 
lent to the use of the corresponding  two series for  fluctuations  in the labor  share.  To  see 
which series has more classical  measurement  error  we use U.S. data from 1947.III  to 
1989.I  to run regressions of the logarithm  of one share on the other including  a trend 
and a correction  for first-order  serial  correlation.  When the share  using hourly  earnings 
is on the right-hand side its coefficient  equals 0.73 and is statistically  different  from 
one. When that using compensation  is on the right-hand  side, its coefficient  is 0.93 and 
is not statistically  different from one. We thus cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
earnings  share equals the compensation  share plus noise. 88 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
assumption  about the average  level  of the markup in order to construct 
the series,  we  present  here only our constructed  series for the deviation 
from  trend,  to  make  it  clear that  we  do  not  pretend  to  have  directly 
measured  the level.  Figure 2 represents  our baseline  cases,  ',* =  1.6, e = 
1. Figure 3 shows  the consequences  of assuming  instead  e =  0.5,  while 
Figure 4 presents  the case /.* = 2, e = 1. In each case, the deviation of the 
logarithm of hours from trend is shown  as well; it is clear that for each of 
these  sets  of parameters  the constructed  series  displays  strongly  coun- 
tercyclical markup variations. 
The effects  of parameter variation are easily understood.  Assuming  a 
lower  elasticity  e implies  a sharper  decline  in  the  marginal  product  of 
hours  in booms,  and  so  increases  the  amplitude  of the  countercyclical 
variation in the series constructed  for Ft.  Assuming  a higher /l* implies a 
higher  steady  state H/H because  of (3.3), and hence  a larger estimate  of 
the percentage  increase in Ht -  Ht for any given observed  increase in Ht. 
For any  given  e,  this  then  implies  a  sharper  decline  in  the  marginal 
Figure  3 DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF HOURS  AND THE  MARKUP 
(e =  0.5, /.* =  1.6) 
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product  of  hours  in  booms,  so  that  a  higher  I*  results  in  a  greater 
amplitude  of countercyclical  variation in Ft.  (Note the different scales for 
the markup series in Figs. 2-4.) 
Our result that markups  are countercyclical  confirm the conclusion  of 
Bils (1987), although  we  obtain this result for a different reason.  Focus- 
ing on the baseline  case of e =  1, (3.6) becomes 
I  *s  f  i-  t  USH  =  -At-  ,  l  (3.8)H 
1 -  /t*SK  -  1 SK 
(3.8) 
where  sHt  denotes  log deviations  of the share of hours.  If ,*  equals one, 
and given that sH +  SK = 1 (which then implies the absence of fixed costs), 
It  is simply  the negative  of sHt,  which  is not very strongly cyclical. But if 
we assume  Iu*  >  1 (and hence  increasing  returns), then a countercyclical 
term is added  to  't. Bils assumes  instead  a production  function with the 
implication that the marginal product and the average product of produc- 
tion  workers'  hours  decrease  in  proportion  to  one  another  [which 
Figure  4 DEVIATIONS  FROM  TREND  OF HOURS  AND THE  MARKUP 
(e = 1, i*  = 2) 
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amounts,  in our notation,  to deletion  of the final term in (3.8)], but he 
points  out that the relevant wage  zw  is the marginal wage  (the wage paid 
for marginal hours)  rather than the average wage.  These two quantities 
can differ if the  utilization  of overtime  labor is cyclical and  if overtime 
hours must be paid more than straight-time hours.  With this correction, 
he obtains 
t  SHt  -  Ut 
where  ut represents  the log deviation  of the ratio of the marginal wage to 
the average  wage.  In Appendix  2 we  show  how  to compute  this correc- 
tion with  our data.  Bils' method  for estimating  at depends  crucially on 
regarding  the  overtime  premium  as allocative.  For a criticism, see  Hall 
(1988b). Because  we  are uncertain of the extent to which  Bils' treatment 
of  the  overtime  premium  is  justified,  we  present  most  of  our  results 
without  this correction. 
Even in the absence  of any premium,  the variation in the use of over- 
time would  affect our calculations if straight-time and overtime hours are 
not perfect substitutes.  This may well be the case,  as an increase in the 
number  of  hours  per  worker  may  increase  the  number  of  hours  that 
capital  is  in  use,  while  an  increase  in  the  number  of  employees  who 
work a standard  shift does  not.  This is assumed  in Hansen  and Sargent 
(1988), and indeed  helps  explain  the systematic  cyclical variation in the 
use of overtime  hours. 
In Appendix  2,  we  show  that in the baseline  case  of e =  1, with  no 
fixed  costs  (,*  =  1),  and  assuming  no  premium  for overtime  hours, 




SHt-  (h2t-  ht)  (3.9) 
E12 
where h2t  and ht represent  the percentage  deviation  of overtime and total 
(straight-time  plus  overtime)  hours,  respectively,  while  E12  equals  the 
elasticity of substitution  between  the two kinds of hours.  Hence,  if E12 < 
o,  markups  become  more  countercyclical  the  more  procyclical  is  the 
movement  of overtime  hours  relative to total hours.  In Appendix  2, we 
show  that overtime  hours  increase  by 7% for each  1% increase  in total 
hours.  Hence,  if E12 =  6, (3.9) implies 
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This is exactly our baseline  markup series  [the one implied  by (3.8) in 
the  case  of  e  =  1 and  /*  =  1.6].  Hence  the  degree  of  countercyclical 
markup  variation  indicated  by  Figure 2 could  easily  result  even  in the 
complete  absence  of increasing  returns. It should  be noted  that the elas- 
ticity  612  =  6  is  more  than  twice  the  value  assumed  by  Hansen  and 
Sargent  (E12 =  1/0.36) who  assume  that adding  overtime  hours  has  no 
effect  on  the  marginal  product  of straight-time  hours.  It is thus  hardly 
outside  the  range  of  plausibility.  But because  the  connection  between 
overtime  and  the  work  week  of capital is hard to measure  directly, we 
implicitly  assume  E12 =  o. It should  be  clear,  however,  that  assuming  a 
lower  value  for E12, together  with  a lower  value  for /*,  would  result in 
constructed  series  for markup  variations  very  similar to those  we  use. 
Our specification  of production  possibilities  is obviously  overly simple 
in many  respects,  and  many  of its  shortcomings  deserve  more careful 
attention  in the future.  As we  noted  in the introduction,  the cost of an 
additional  hour  of work  probably differs from the wage.  However,  the 
most  obvious  corrections  make  this cost more procyclical so that mark- 
ups are even  more countercyclical  than is implied by our method.21 
4. The  Evidence  from  the  Aggregate  Data 
4.1 THREE  METHODS  FOR  EVALUATING  THE  COMPETING 
THEORIES 
In the  next  two  subsections  we  estimate  the  coefficients  of  (2.19).  The 
problem  with  estimating  (2.19) is that we  lack direct observations  on xt. 
We have  three methods  for dealing  with  this issue.  The first uses  mea- 
surements  of Tobin's q, the  ratio of firms' market value  to the value  of 
their capital in  place.  The  total market value  of all firms V is equal  to 
21. One  defect  of average  wages  is that they  abstract from the heterogeneity  of different 
workers'  hours.  As  many  studies  have  shown  (e.g.,  Kydland  and  Prescott,  1988; 
Barsky and  Solon,  1989),  the  most  important  such  bias  has  to  do  with  the  greater 
cyclical variability of low-wage  (and presumably  low-productivity)  hours. Suppose  that 
low-wage  and  high-wage  hours  are two  distinct  factors of production,  and assume  a 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  We can measure  the  markup as the  ratio of the 
marginal  product  of low-wage  hours  to the  low  wage.  Then,  corresponding  to (3.8), 
one obtains 
(  *SHL  )  ?t  =  -SHLt-  1  - 
S 
nLt 
where  hLt represents  the log deviation  of low-wage  hours from trend, SHL  represents  the 
trend value of the share of payments  to low-wage  hours in output,  and so on. Both sHLt 
and  fLt  should  be  more  procyclical  than  the  corresponding  ^Ht  and  ht in  (3.8).  These 
considerations  tend  to make  i, more countercyclical.  On the other hand,  sHL is smaller 
than SH, so the direction of the overall bias is not certain. 92 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
V,=  (1  +  A)Kt  +  X,  -  t  (4.1) 
where  Kt  equals  the replacement  cost of capital, At  equals the ratio of the 
shadow  price of adjusting  capital to capital's replacement  cost, and  t  is 
the  present  value  of fixed  costs.  The term  t includes  the present  dis- 
counted  value  of  taxes  levied  from firms as well  as random  misvalua- 
tions  of  the  stock  market.  Then  the  logarithmic  deviation  of Tobin's q 
should  equal 
(1 + A)K-  V  (1 + A)K  X  (P 
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where  the  ratios  with  (V)  in  the  denominator  represent  steady  state 
values,  and where  It represents  the logarithmic deviation of (1 + A)  from 
its steady-state  value. 
Assuming  that on average,  equilibrium  pure profits are zero (X =  () 
(4.2) becomes 
x 
qt = ~t- +  (t  , -  +  t).  (4.3)  (1 + A)K 
Thus,  the  variations  in  it  and  in  4t  prevent  qt from being  a perfect 
proxy  for  xt.  Absent  these  variations,  one  could  substitute  (4.3)  into 
(2.19) and obtain 
(1 + A)K 
t =  E  xqt -  Eyt.  (4.4) 
Equation  (4.4) can be  estimated  by  ordinary least-squares  with  ^  as 
the dependent  variable if classical  measurement  error in  ^  is the main 
source of error. This is not likely given  that our procedure for construct- 
ing ,t  uses  variables  that are correlated with q and y. Any  specification 
error is likely to be correlated with  these  variables. 
An alternative  is to run a regression  of qt on the other variables.  This 
will recover the coefficients  in (4.4) if the main error term in (4.4) comes 
from shocks  to $t that are uncorrelated  with xt. Examples of such shocks 
might  include  regulatory  changes  and  random  misvaluations  of  the 
stock market.  However,  even  these  shocks  may have  a direct effect on 
demand  so  that they  affect all the  other variables.  Running  the regres- 
sion  might  also  be justified  if there  are important  fluctuations  in kt as 
long as these  have  one  important  feature.  Investment  (and so Kt) would Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  ' 93 
have  to respond  to short-term sales  expectations,  which  are largely  or- 
thogonal  to the variations in long-run sales expectations  that affect xt. The 
obvious  problem with this reverse regression  is that changes  in rates that 
affect  Xt and  (t  by  similar  amounts  have  little  effect  on  qt. Thus,  the 
coefficient  on  1t (which  is affected by these  shocks) will be biased down- 
ward. 
All attempts  to use  data on q as a proxy for X are clearly problematic, 
given  our inability  to observe  either  Kt or 4t directly. Furthermore,  the 
expected  profits variable Xt occurring in (4.1) may not be the same as the 
one  that affects markup determination  in the theories  described  in Sec- 
tion 2. Suppose  for example that, as discussed  earlier, the parameter (1 - 
a) is taken to indicate not the probability of disappearance  of an industry 
but  rather  the  probability  of  renegotiation  of  the  collusive  agreement 
among  oligopolists.  Then the discounted  profits that determine  the size 
of  the  maximum  feasible  penalty  for deviation  involve  discounting  of 
future profits by the factor a as in (2.20), but the discounted  profits that 
determine  the value  of the stock market should  not involve  discounting 
by this factor. This provides  another  possible  source of misspecification 
in (4.4).  Hence  it is desirable  to find another  way  of making  inferences 
about variations  in X. 
Our second  procedure  starts from the observation  that (2.20) implies 
Xt =  Et  ,  [t+l  + Xt+l]  (4.5) 
IY  qt 
where  rIt denotes  aggregate  profits in period t. In the steady state where 
capital,  output,  and  profits  grow  at  the  rate g,  the  trend  value  of  Xt 
equals the trend value  nt times  5/(1 -  8), where 
=  (1  +  g) 
y(l  +  r*) 
and r* is the trend value  of the real rate at which  profits are discounted. 
Therefore,  the log-linearization  of (4.5) gives 
t =  Et{(1 -  86)rt+l +  X  t+l-  rt+}  (4.6) 
where  rt is the log  deviation  from trend of the gross  real rate of return 
between  t -  1 and t. Moreover,  linearizing  (2.3) gives 
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We  can  use  these  two  linearizations  to  estimate  the  coefficients  of 
(2.19) using  two  alternative  procedures.  The first involves  substituting 
for both Xt  and xt,+ in (4.6) using  (2.19) and (4.7). This gives 
1t +  EYt=-  Et{ [8+  (1 -  )  *  1 ]t+l+[8EY+(l-58)EX]t+1-EXrt+l  .  (4.8) 
If one  eliminates  the expected  value  operator from (4.8) one  obtains an 
equation  whose  residual  is supposed  to be uncorrelated  with  informa- 
tion available  at t. Following  the suggestions  of Hansen  (1982) we  esti- 
mate  this  equation  by  instrumental  variables.  The  great advantage  of 
this method  over the one based on observations  of q is that changes  in 4t 
and  in  it  do  not  affect  the  estimates.  We can also  avoid  the  problems 
associated  with  the  possible  difference  between  the  rate at which  the 
stock market discounts  future  profits  and the relevant  rate for markup 
determination.  To implement  this procedure,  we  need  a value  for 8. In 
our baseline  case we will let 8 take on a value equal to 0.9. However,  we 
also consider letting a/y equal to one so that 8 equals just (1 + g)/(1 + r*), 
which,  in the case of stock returns,  is 0.987. 
Our third  procedure  involves  substituting  (4.7) in  (4.6) and  solving 
forward so that 
x, =  E  )(y  +  8 [(1  )  -  8)r  t+i++l  (4.9) 
ji=o  L-\1  J  , 
To obtain  estimates  of  this  level  of xt, we  use  techniques  analogous  to 
those  in Hansen  and Sargent (1980) and Campbell and Shiller (1988). In 
other words,  we  estimate  a vector autoregression  including  at least the 
variables  ,,  y,  and  r. We can write  this  vector  autoregression  in com- 
pact  notation  as  zt  =  Azt_1  +  Et, where  the  vector  zt includes  both 
current  and  lagged  realizations  of  the  included  variables.  We let  the 
first three elements  of zt be Yt, -t, and rt. The resulting  estimate  of xt is 
then v' A[I -  8A]-lzt, where  v is a vector whose  first three elements  are 
given  by  (1  -  5),  (1-8)/(,L*-1),  and  (-1),  respectively,  while  its other 
elements  all equal zero. 
We use these  estimates  of xt to run regressions  of the form of (2.19) and 
thereby obtain estimates  of ex and Ey.  We also use these estimates  of x to 
discover  whether  x  -  y  is  pro-  or countercyclical.  Here  the  customer 
market and  the  implicit  collusion  model  make  opposite  predictions,  at 
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An  issue  that  our  methods  do  not  solve  is  that,  in  practice,  there 
probably exist changes  in markups that are not due to changes  in either 
xt or Yt. These  specification  errors could  well  affect our estimates  since 
exogenous  changes  in  markups  might,  in  turn,  affect  output  and  X. 
Even here, the specification  in (4.8) might be more robust to the presence 
of such  errors than that in (4.4). The reason is that the markup and the 
level  of output  enter in (4.8) essentially  as first differences  and,  in addi- 
tion, its parameters are estimated  via instrumental  variables. So, as long 
as whatever  predictable exogenous  changes  in markups exist do not also 
affect expected  rates of return and expected  growth  in output,  the esti- 
mates remain valid. 
The  linearizations  that  lead  to  our  estimating  equations  involve  the 
logarithmic  deviations  from trend  values.  Instead  of prior detrending, 
we include  instead  the logarithm of the variables and add a constant and 
a deterministic  trend. In particular, we compute  markup variations using 
the logarithm of output,  hours and real wages  in (3.6). 
We present  results  for our three estimation  methods  in three subsec- 
tions.  The first covers the estimates  from (4.4) by ordinary least-squares. 
The second  discusses  the estimates  from estimating  (4.8) by instrumen- 
tal variables.  Finally, the third presents  the results when  we use  (4.9) to 
obtain a proxy for the level  of x. 
4.2 ESTIMATES  BASED  ON TOBIN'S  q 
Our baseline  markup  variation  series  is constructed  assuming  an aver- 
age markup ,*  equal to 1.6 and an elasticity of substitution  of capital for 
labor e equal to 1.0, and ignoring  overtime.  We estimate this equation in 
two ways.  First, we  estimate  it in levels.  The residuals  from this estima- 
tion  are  highly  serially  correlated,  so  that  we  report  standard  errors 
constructed  using  the procedure  suggested  by Newey  and West (1987), 
which  is also  robust  to the  presence  of heteroscedasticity.  Second,  we 
estimate  it assuming  the residuals  have  first order serial correlation.  In 
this later case,  p is the autocorrelation  of the residual.  Using data for the 
period  1952.II to 1988.IV, these  two estimation  procedures  yield 
t = 0.77  + 1.4  x  10-5t -  0.63yt + 0.058qt 
(0.5)  (0.0007)  (0.08)  (0.015) 
R2  =  0.983  DW  =  0.16 
t =  -0.72  0.002t  -  0.42yt + 0.035qt 
(0.6)  (0.0007)  (0.09)  (0.014) 
p3  0.934  R2 =  0.997  DW =  1.54. 96 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
The  coefficients  and  standard  errors  of  the  levels  and  quasi-differ- 
enced  regressions  are similar. In both cases,  the coefficient  on output  is 
negative  while  that on q is positive  as required by the implicit collusion 
model,  and  thus  of the opposite  sign  than the coefficients  predicted  by 
the  customer  market  model.  Moreover,  since  both  coefficients  are sig- 
nificantly  different  from  zero  at  conventional  significance  levels,  the 
customer market model  is statistically rejected. The fact that Ex  is statisti- 
cally  different  from  zero  also  leads  us  to  reject  static  models  of  the 
markup where  the  only  determinant  of the markup is the current level 
of output. 
According  to  (4.4),  the  coefficient  on  Yt is  -ey  while  that  on  qt is 
[(l+A)KEx]/X. Ignoring  the  average  value  of  A, which  is  presumably 
small, we  need  to multiply  the latter by X/K to obtain an estimate  of ex. 
According  to  our  model,  this  expression  equals  8(1-1/u*)Y/(1-8)K, 
which  equals  3.75Y/K for our baseline  case.  Since  Y/K is roughly  0.1,22 
the implied  values  for Ex  are just over 0.01 and just over 0.02 for the two 
cases.  Both  are certainly  smaller  than  p*  -  1 as the  implicit  collusion 
model  requires. 
We show  in  Table 1 how  the  coefficients  from the  quasi-differenced 
form vary as we  vary p* and e. Increases in  L*  raise the variability of the 
markup.  In particular, they  amplify  the  reduction  in  1t  for a given  in- 
crease  in At. As  a result,  a given  increase  in Yt  reduces  the markup by 
more.  This explains  why  the  coefficient  on Yt  falls as g* rises.  What is 
somewhat  more  unexpected  is that increases  in g* also raise the coeffi- 
cient on q so that the implied  value of Ex  rises as well. 
For a given  average  markup,  increases  in e raise the coefficient  on Yt 
while  having  no effect on the coefficient  on q,. The reason for this appar- 
ently  anomalous  result  can be  seen  from the  formula  (3.6) giving  our 
measure  of  markup  variations.  For a  given  u* [and hence  H/(H-H)], 
changes  in e affect markup variations  only by affecting  the influence  of 
private  output  on  the  markup.  In  particular  increases  in  e raise  the 
weight  of changes  in output  on the measured  markup. These  increases 
therefore raise the estimated  effect of Yt  on /t. 
We now  turn to estimation  of the same equation but with qt  on the left- 
hand  side.  We again  consider  separately  the  estimation  in levels  with 
robust standard  errors and the estimation  in quasi-first differences.  For 
our baseline  series  on  markup  variations,  the estimation  of such  equa- 
tions including  both a constant  and a trend yields 
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qt =  -15.8  -  0.015t  +  4.33y,  +  3.96,t 
(4.8)  (0.006)  (0.78)  (0.84) 
R2=  0.952  DW  =  1.81 
qt =  -4.66  -  0.006t  +  1.29y,  +  1.20,t 
(2.5)  (0.006)  (0.52) (0.48) 
p =  0.969  R2 =  0.952  DW  =  1.81. 
The  coefficient  on  the  markup  equals  X/KEx  and  that on  private value 
added  equals  XEy/KEx. The estimates  of both  Ey  and  Ex  are positive.  In 
addition,  the ratio of the coefficient on yt over that on  it gives Ey,  which is 
thus  estimated  to be  near one  in both  specifications.  What does  differ 
between  the levels  and the quasi-differenced  specification  is the implied 
estimate  of ex. 
To obtain an estimate  of ex we  must multiply  the inverse  of the coeffi- 
cient on ,u by 3.75Y/K. This gives estimates  of Ex  of 0.09 in the levels form 
and 0.45 in the quasi-differenced  one.  Both are, once again, below  .* - 
1.  These  conclusions  are  sensitive  to  our  use  of  a  8 equal  to  0.9.  If 
instead,  one assumes  that aly is one so that 8 equals 0.987, our estimate 
of X/KEx  rises to 3 (from 0.375). The result is that the implied levels  of Ex 
rise  to  0.73  for the  levels  regression  and  2.4  for the  quasi-differenced 
one.  Both, particularly the latter, are larger than  j*  -  1. 
In Table 2 we  show  how  the coefficients  on Yt  and  ^ vary in the quasi- 
differenced  form  as  we  vary  JL*  and  e.  As  we  increase  the  average 
markup  (and hence  increase  its variability) the correlation between  the 
Table  1  ESTIMATION  OF QUASI-DIFFERENCED  EQUATION  (5.4) FOR 
DIFFERENT  SPECIFICATIONS 
_,~~Elasticity  of  ,Average  Markup 
Elasticity  of 
substitution  Coefficient  on  1.2  1.6  2 
0.5  qt  0.020  0.035  0.058 
(0.010)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Yt  -0.364  -1.083  -2.099 
(0.06)  (0.69)  (0.132) 
1  9t  0.020  0.035  0.058 
(0.010)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Yt  0.065  -0.416  -1.099 
(0.06)  (0.50)  (0.132) 
2  qt  0.020  0.035  0.058 
(0.010)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Yt  0.279  -0.083  -0.599 
(0.06)  (0.49)  (0.132) 98 - ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
markup  and  stock  prices  falls  so  that the  former falls.  In contrast,  the 
latter coefficient  estimate  rises as we increase the average markup. 
For a given  average  markup,  increases  in e lower  the estimated  value 
of XEy/KEx  while  having  no effect on the estimate of X/KEx.  The reason for 
this is,  once  again,  that the increases  in e raise the influence  of Yt  on  At. 
Increases in e therefore  reduce  the regressions'  estimate  of the indepen- 
dent effect of output  on stock prices. 
We now  consider  the  sensitivity  of our results  to the addition  of the 
Bils  correction  for  the  difference  between  the  average  and  marginal 
wage.  We obtain this correction using  the method  given  in Appendix  2. 
The resulting  correction  is reasonably  substantial.  We estimate  that the 
increased  use  of overtime  implies  that, when  hours rise by 1% the aver- 
age wage  rises by 0.056 of 1%, while  the marginal wage rises by 0.417 of 
1%. Using  the  resulting  markup  series,  estimation  of  the  quasi-differ- 
enced  form of (4.4) for our basic case yields 
A-t  =  -0.56  -  0.002t  -  0.66yt + 0.043qt 
(0.7)  (0.0009)  (0.10)  (0.017) 
Period: 1952.II-1988.IV  p =  0.944  R2 =  0.998  DW =  1.54. 
The reverse  equation  with  q on the left-hand  side yields  instead 
qt =  -4.92  -  0.006t  +  1.49yt +  1.06/,t 
(2.5)  (0.006)  (0.55)  (0.41) 
Period: 1952.II-1988.IV  p = 0.969  R2 =  0.952  DW  =  1.82. 
Table  2  ESTIMATION  OF QUASI-DIFFERENCED  EQUATION  (5.4) WITH  q 
AS THE  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE 
~~Elasticity  of~~  ~Average  markup  Elasticity  of 
substitution  Coefficient  on  1.2  1.6  2 
0.5  it  1.52  1.20  0.86 
(0.74)  (0.48)  (0.32) 
Yt  1.34  2.09  2.59 
(0.55)  (0.69)  (0.86) 
1  fit  1.52  1.20  0.86 
(0.74)  (0.48)  (0.32) 
Yt  0.68  1.21  1.73 
(0.51)  (0.50)  (0.58) 
2  tyt  1.52  1.20  0.86 
(0.74)  (0.48)  (0.32) 
Yt  0.36  0.89  1.31 
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In both  cases,  the  estimate  of ey rises with  the correction.  This is not 
surprising  since  the  correction  makes  marginal  cost  more  procyclical. 
However,  the estimates  of Ex  are not very much affected by the correction. 
4.3 INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  ESTIMATES  OF (4.8) 
The estimation  of  (4.8) by  instrumental  variables  offers  several  advan- 
tages  over the procedures  that rely on observations  of q. First, the esti- 
mates  are  less  affected  by  variations  in  either  Xt and  4t. Second,  the 
method  does  not require observations  on the present  discounted  value 
of profits  X. It does  however  require information  on discount  rates (or 
marginal rates of substitution).  Given  the inadequacies  of various  rates 
of return as discount  rates, we  experiment  with  the return on the stock 
market, the return on Treasury Bills, and the return on prime commer- 
cial paper. Third, it allows us to recover quantitative estimates for both Ey 
and Ex  more easily. Finally, this method  might be somewhat  less prone to 
endogeneity  bias. 
We include  a constant  and  a trend  as  well  as  the  logarithms  of the 
markup, output,  hours,  the real wage,  and the level of real returns in our 
estimation.  As instruments  we use a constant,  a linear trend, the current 
and one lagged value of the logarithms of output,  the labor input, and the 
real wage  as well as the ex post real return between  t -  1 and t. 
The results  of estimating  (4.8) for the period  1947.III to 1988.IV using 
our baseline  markup  series  and the return on the stock market are pre- 
sented  in Table 3. We show  estimates  and summary statistics for both the 
case where  Ey =  Ex =  E, and for the case where  Ey  and Ex  are allowed  to 
differ. 
Table  3  THE  BASIC  INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  SPECIFICATIONS:  U.S. 
DATA 1947.III-1988.IV 
Parameter  Separate  coefficients  Constrained  coefficients 
Constant  0.538  -0.028 
(0.18)  (0.10) 
Coefficient  on trend  0.32x10-3  -0.33x10-3 
(0.2x10-3)  (0.6x10-4) 
EY  0.994 
(0.21) 
Ex  0.243 
(0.07) 
E  0.207 
(0.06) 
DW  2.21  1.62 
1  1.51  2.52 100 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
The  summary  statistics  reported  in Table 3 concerning  the  fit of the 
two equations  are encouraging.  The Durbin-Watson  statistic reveals that 
little serial correlation remains in the errors. Because we use more instru- 
ments  than there are coefficients,  the two  equations  are overidentified. 
The test statistic proposed  by Hansen  (1982) to test these overidentifying 
restrictions is reported  in the row marked J, and is distributed  2 with 5 
and 6 degrees  of freedom  under the null hypothesis  that the restrictions 
are valid.  The actual values  of this statistic are very small, which  proba- 
bly indicates  that the instruments  are quite collinear. 
Turning to the estimates,  consider first the case where Ey  and Ex  are not 
constrained  to be equal. A 1% increase in X is then estimated  to raise the 
markup  by  about  a fifth of a percentage  point.  A  1% increase  in  Y by 
contrast  lowers  the  markup  by  about  1%. Both  these  coefficients  are 
statistically significantly  different from zero. 
The estimates  of Ey  and Ex  are inconsistent  with the homothetic versions 
of both dynamic  models  because  they are statistically significantly differ- 
ent from each other. Once homotheticity  is dropped,  Ey  can be larger than 
Ex as long  as the  elasticity  of demand  is higher  when  Y is large.  Then 
increases  in  Y raise disproportionately  the number  of customers  that a 
deviator  gets  for a given  change  in his  markup.  This disproportionate 
increase  implies  that deviations  become  much  more attractive when  Y 
increases.  They  thus  require relatively  large reductions  in the markup. 
Measurement  difficulties  provide  an  alternative  explanation  for  the 
difference  between  the two  coefficients.  To gain some  intuition  into the 
source  of  this  discrepancy  imagine  first that  8 equals  one.  Then,  (4.8) 
makes  the  expected  change  in the logarithm  of the  markup between  t 
and  t +  1 a linear function  of the  expected  change  in the logarithm  of 
private value  added  (with coefficient  Ey)  and of the expected  real rate of 
return between  t and t +  1 (with coefficient  Ex). 
Since  we  set  8 equal  to  0.9,  the  finding  that  Ey  exceeds  Ex probably 
reflects that the  expected  change  in private value  added  is more corre- 
lated with  the change  in the markup than is the expected  discount  rate. 
This could well be due to the fact that the relevant discount  rate for firms 
differs  from  the  expected  return  on  stocks,  so  that  the  measurement 
error in rt  biases the estimate of Ex  downward.  One piece of evidence  that 
lends  credence  to  this  interpretation  is  that,  as  we  show  below,  the 
estimates  of Ex  rise substantially  when  we use other rates of return. 
An  additional  prediction  of  the  implicit  collusion  model  is  that  Ex 
should  be less  than  L*  -  1. This restriction is satisfied whether  Ey  and Ex 
are allowed  to  differ  as  in  the  first column,  or whether  they  are con- 
strained  to be equal,  as in the second  column.  In the latter column,  the Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  *  101 
estimate  of the  elasticity  of the  markup with  respect  to X/Y, e, is 0.21, 
which  is well below  0.6 while  remaining  significantly  positive. 
The difference between  the J statistics reported in the two columns  can 
be used  to test  whether  the  restriction  that the  two  elasticities  are the 
same is valid.  This is the analogue  of the likelihood  ratio test proposed 
by Gallant and Jorgenson  (1979), and it sometimes  produces  inferences 
that are at variance  with  those  from Wald tests  based  on  the  standard 
errors of the  coefficients.  Indeed,  in this case,  the Wald test rejects the 
equality  of  the  two  coefficients,  but  the  difference  between  the  two  J 
statistics is 1.01, which  is well below  the critical value for the x2 distribu- 
tion with one  degree  of freedom. 
In Tables 4,  5,  and  6 we  report variations  on  the  model  that are de- 
signed  to gauge  the robustness  of our results.  Tables 4 and 5 are devoted 
to obtaining estimates  for different values  of the average markup and for 
different  values  of  the  elasticity  of  substitution.  We again  consider  in 
particular elasticities  of substitution  equal to 0.5,  1, and 2, and average 
markups of 1.2, 1.6, and 2. Table 4 is devoted  to estimates  when  the two 
elasticities  are equal,  while  the estimates  of Table 5 are obtained without 
imposing  this restriction. 
The two parameters ,*  and e affect the results. As explained in Section 
3, increases  in ,*  and reductions  in e both increase  the tendency  of the 
markup to be countercyclical.  It is thus not surprising that our estimates 
of e in Table 4 and those  of ey in Table 5 tend to rise with ,*  and fall with 
e. What is once  again more surprising is that the estimates  of ex in Table 
5, which  correspond  to estimates  of the effect of expected  rates of return 
on the markup,  also increase with ,*  and fall with e. With the exception 
of the estimates  corresponding  to an e of 0.5 and an average markup of 
1.2,  the  estimates  of  e  and  ex in  Tables 4  and  5  are  lower  than  the 
corresponding  /t* -  1 as required by the implicit collusion  model. 
Table  4  INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  METHOD:  ELASTICITY  OF THE 
MARKUP  WITH  RESPECT  TO X/Y 
Elasticity  of  Average  markup 
substitution  1.2  1.6  2 
0.5  0.310  0.240  0.399 
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.16) 
1  0.189  0.207  0.345 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.11) 
2  0.144  0.210  0.346 
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Table  5  INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  METHOD:  SEPARATE  ELASTICITIES 
OF THE  MARKUP  WITH  RESPECT  TO Y AND X 
-,~~Elasticity  of  .Average  markup 
Elasticity  of 
substitution  Coefficient  on  1.2  1.6  2 
0.5  Ey  0.235  1.592  2.882 
(0.32)  (0.21)  (0.35) 
Ex  0.360  0.248  0.432 
(0.22)  (0.08)  (0.14) 
1  Ey  0.183  0.994  1.987 
(0.14)  (0.21)  (0.32) 
Ex  0.190  0.243  0.422 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
2  Ey  0.042  0.689  1.530 
(0.12)  (0.21)  (0.35) 
ex  0.146  0.238  0.413 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.11) 
Table 6 presents  other  variations  while  holding  the  average  markup 
and elasticity of substitution  fixed at our base levels of 1.6 and 1. Some of 
these  have  no material effect on  the results.  As can be seen  in the first 
row, this is true in particular when  we change our instruments  by replac- 
ing the lagged  return with the lagged  dividend-price  ratio. It is also true 
when  we  use  hourly  earnings  in manufacturing  instead  of hourly com- 
pensation  as our measure  of the wage.  This can be seen  by comparing 
the  results  in the  last three  rows  with  the  corresponding  results  using 
hourly compensation. 
Somewhat  more substantive  differences  emerge  when  we replace the 
stock return by returns on Treasury Bills and commercial paper.23  In the 
second  and  third rows  of Table 6, it is apparent  that the resulting  esti- 
mates of Ex  are larger (while those of Ey  are smaller). The evidence  against 
the  homothetic  versions  of  the  models  is  now  much  weaker;  the  two 
coefficients  Ex  and Ey  are now  not statistically different from each other. 
On the other hand,  the estimates  of Ex  now  exceed ,*  -  1, though  not by 
a statistically significant  amount. 
The next  three  rows  of Table 6 illustrate the effects  of changing  8 by 
changing  aly.  In particular, they present estimates  from letting ca/y  equal 
one. The resulting increase in 8 raises the estimate of Ey  and lowers that of 
23. These estimates are constructed  by assuming that there is a risk premium  attached  to 
these  rates of return,  so that the average  interest  rate r is equal to the average rate of 
return in the  stock  market.  This adjustment  has  a negligible  effect on  the  estimates. 
However,  some  adjustment  of this form is needed  when  a/y  is one,  to ensure  that X 
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Table  6  INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES  METHOD:  VARIATIONS  WITH 
AVERAGE  MARKUP  EQUAL  TO 1.6 AND ELASTICITY  OF 
SUBSTITUTION  EQUAL  TO 1 
Ey  Ex 
Use of lagged dividend/price  ratio  instead of lagged return  as  1.020  0.208 
an instrument  (0.20)  (0.06) 
Use of return  on Treasury  Bills  instead of stock return  0.550  0.713 
(0.13)  (0.15) 
Use of return  on commercial  paper instead of stock return  0.491  0.751 
(0.14)  (0.14) 
Use of stock return  but 5=0.987 so that a/y equals one  1.062  0.184 
(0.20)  (0.06) 
Use of return  on Treasury  Bills  with 5=0.987  0.933  0.365 
(0.17)  (0.25) 
Use of return  on commercial  paper with 6=0.987  0.916  0.455 
(0.19)  (0.24) 
Use of stock returns and hourly earnings in manufacturing  1.270  0.354 
instead of hourly private  compensation  (0.28)  (0.10) 
Use of hourly earnings and return  on Treasury  Bills  0.670  0.706 
(0.14)  (0.14) 
Use of hourly earnings and return  on commercial  paper  0.570  0.803 
(0.14)  (0.13) 
ex. Note from (4.8) and (4.9) that a reduction in 8 makes x more sensitive to 
near term changes  in profitability. So the increase in ex as one  lowers  8 
means  that markups  are relatively more correlated with changes  in near 
term profitability than with interest rates. 
4.4 THE  ESTIMATES  OF x BASED  ON (4.9) 
To obtain our last proxy for the level  of x we  run vector autoregressions 
that include  Y, (1, r, and  h and  the logarithmic  deviation  from trend of 
aggregate  investment.  We used  the  L series  constructed  assuming  an 
elasticity  of  substitution  of  1.0  and  a  ,*  equal  to  1.6.  These  vector 
autoregressions  explain each variable with two lags of itself and two lags 
of each of the other variables.24 We then  computed  x for our two values 
of  8 and  for our  three  rates  of  return.  The  results  are summarized  in 
Table 7.  In  the  first  column  we  report  the  correlation  of  |  with  the 
relevant measure  of xt -  Yt.  As predicted by the implicit collusion  model, 
these  correlations are uniformly  positive. 
In the next two columns  we report estimates of ex and Ey  from running a 
regression  of  L  on our proxy for x and on y. The estimates are once again 
consistent  with  the implicit collusion  model,  and, at least when  8 equals 
24. We experimented  with including three lags and the results were essentially  identical. Table 7  RESULTS BASED ON xt CONSTRUCTED WITH VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION 
Regression  based  on  Reverse 
(3.19)  regressions  ._.  Correlation  of  Correlation  of 
,u and  x-y  Ex  Ey  1/ex  Ey/Ex  y and x-y 
Stock returns 
6=0.9  0.115  0.170  0.919  1.54  3.67  0.613 
(0.02)  (0.09)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
5=0.987  0.127  0.028  0.737  8.80  15.7  0.580 
(0.004)  (0.076)  (1.8)  (1.8) 
Treasury Bill returns 
8=0.9  0.713  0.461  0.671  0.979  0.966  -0.324 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
5=0.987  0.209  0.102  0.669  1.90  3.31  0.376 
(0.02)  (0.11)  (0.4)  (0.5) 
Commercial  paper returns 
5=0.9  0.646  0.344  0.604  1.03  0.95  -0.312 
(0.04)  (0.09)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
5=0.987  0.152  0.066  0.628  2.26  4.00  0.375 
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0.9, are similar to the estimates  obtained  from the instrumental  variables 
procedure.  In the case where  8 equals 0.987, the estimate of Ex is substan- 
tially smaller than that obtained  from the differenced  form (4.8). 
Standard errors obtained  using  the Newey-West  method  to allow for 
both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity  are reported below the esti- 
mates.  These  standard errors suggest  that both Ex  and Ey  are statistically 
significantly  different  from zero,  so that the alternative models  are once 
again rejected. 
The  next  two  columns  present  "reverse"  regressions  of  our  con- 
structed proxy for x on  a  and 9. The coefficient on y measures  Ey/Ex.  This 
coefficient  is  estimated  to be  much  larger than  one  whenever  8 equals 
0.987.  Here  too,  reducing  8  raises  the  sensitivity  of  x  to  near  term 
changes  in  profitability  and,  as a result,  makes  (  more  sensitive  to x. 
With  stock  returns,  Ey/EX  is  above  one  even  when  8 is  equal  to  0.9. 
However,  with  the  other  returns,  Ey/EX  is  very  close  to  one  (and  not 
significantly  different from it). Just as in the instrumental variables speci- 
fication,  the estimates  with  these  rates of return are consistent  with  ho- 
mothetic  preferences. 
One important  reason  for computing  our proxy for x is to investigate 
whether  business  cycles might be due to changes  in the markup induced 
by changes  in X/Y. While a complete  analysis  of this question  is beyond 
the scope  of this paper, we  ask at least whether  our estimate  of x -  y is 
pro- or countercyclical.  In the  homothetic  version  of the implicit collu- 
sion model,  markups fall only if x -  y falls. If reductions  in markups are 
to be  a central force  in business  expansions  and  the  implicit  collusion 
model  is to explain  the timing of these  expansions,  x -  y must be coun- 
tercyclical. For the same reason,  the customer market model implies that 
x -  9 should  be procyclical. 
The constructed  x using  stock  market returns is so procyclical that x 
-  y is procyclical as well.  The other measures  of real returns, by contrast, 
give countercyclical  x -  y in our baseline  case where  8 equals 0.9. 
5. Sectoral  Evidence  on Varying  Markups 
This  section  will  address  three  issues  that  will  be  dealt  with  in  three 
subsections.  The first is to see whether  markups are more countercyclical 
in  those  sectors  in  which  the  implicit  collusion  story  makes  the  most 
sense.  That story would  seem grossly  inadequate  if it describes markups 
in  very  unconcentrated  industries  better  than  it describes  markups  in 
more  concentrated  ones.  We  thus  construct  markups  for  different 
two-digit  manufacturing  sectors  to  see  where  markups  are  more 
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The  sectoral  data will  also  allow  us  to understand  better the  role of 
expectations  of future sales.  Expected future sales in an industry depend 
both on current sales  in the industry  and the current state of the econ- 
omy  in  general.  Thus  we  can  use  aggregate  data  to  make  inferences 
about future  sales  in an industry.  This means  that we  have  access  to a 
richer set of proxies  for X, and can expect to observe  more independent 
variation  in  X and  Y when  studying  industry  data.  We exploit  these 
proxies in our second  subsection. 
The third subsection  is devoted  to industry case studies where we have 
specific information  on the source of demand fluctuations and their effect 
on price. We provide  evidence  from the baby food industry and from the 
electric equipment  industry  that appears  consistent  with  the  model  of 
implicit  collusion.  These  industries  would  seem  particularly  relevant 
since they  are very concentrated,  and in the case of the electrical equip- 
ment industry,  members  of the industry  were convicted  of colluding. 
5.1 MARKUP  CYCLICALITY  AND INDUSTRY  CONCENTRATION 
We study  Department  of Commerce  data at the two-digit  SIC level.  This 
is the value-added  data used  by Hall to construct the average level of the 
markup in different  industries.  We address  two  related questions  with 
these data. We investigate  which  sectors have more procyclical real prod- 
uct wages  and which have more countercyclical markups. We are particu- 
larly interested  in the question  whether  wages  are more procyclical and 
markups  more  countercyclical  in more  concentrated  sectors.  Four-firm 
concentration  ratios are hardly perfect as an indicator of whether  collu- 
sion  is possible.  However,  there  are several  reasons  for doubting  that 
collusion  is possible  in sectors with a large number of firms. First, small 
firms tend  to have  a great deal to gain and relatively little to lose  from 
undercutting  their  rivals.  Second,  collusion  requires  a fair amount  of 
coordination  (so that defectors  can be punished),  and this would  seem 
difficult when  there are many firms. 
In the first column  of Table 8, we thus report the 1967 four-firm concen- 
tration ratios for each  two-digit  industry  from Rotemberg  and  Saloner 
(1986). These  concentration  numbers  are themselves  sales-weighted  av- 
erages  of  the  concentrations  of  the  four-digit  industries  that compose 
each  two-digit  sector.  These  concentration  numbers  are  only  weakly 
associated  with  Hall's (1988a) measures  of average industry markups. In 
fact, they  are slightly  negatively  correlated  (Rotemberg and  Summers, 
1990). Some  extension  of our model  is needed  to account for this fact.25 
25. One possible explanation  of the lack of correlation  between Hall's  (1988a)  measures  of 
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One way of gauging  the cross-sectional  implications  of the theory is to 
pretend  initially  that all industries  have  the same  average  markup,  the 
same elasticity of substitution,  and the same correlation between  technol- 
ogy  shocks  and employment.  One  advantage  of this approach is that it 
does not rely on Hall's (1988a) measures  of average markups. Then Equa- 
tion  (4.5) implies  that industries  whose  real wages  are more positively 
correlated with employment  have markups that are more negatively corre- 
lated with employment.  This leads us to analyze the correlation between 
real product wages  and employment  in different industries.  Correlations 
of  this  form  are reported  in  Rotemberg  and  Saloner  (1986). A  related 
question  is which  sectors have real product wages  that fall more in reces- 
sions.  This is the question  asked by Barsky and Solon (1989), who,  for a 
small sample of industries,  run regressions  of the industry's wage divided 
by  the  industry's  PPI on  the  overall  unemployment  rate. Their results 
suggest,  as the implicit collusion  model predicts, that more concentrated 
sectors have more procyclical real wages. 
In Table 8a,  we  report  analogous  results  using  our yearly  two-digit 
data for the period  1948-1985.  We once again consider two measures  for 
the nominal  wage.  The first is total employee  compensation  divided  by 
total hours.  The second  is the industry's  hourly earnings for production 
workers.  We obtain real wages  by dividing  these by the industry's  value 
added  deflator.  The  second  column  in Table 8a reports  the  correlation 
between  the detrended  value  of the logarithm of real hourly compensa- 
tion and the detrended  value of the logarithm of employment.  The third 
reports the correlation for our earnings  based measure. 
The results  in Table 8a are broadly consistent  with  those  reported for 
the  period  1948-1978  by  Rotemberg  and  Saloner  (1986). Concentrated 
industries  and  also  durable  goods  industries  are more likely  to have  a 
positive  correlation  between  real product  wages  and  employment.  To 
gain a crude understanding  of the importance of this effect we present at 
the bottom the cross-sectional  correlation between  concentration and the 
elements  in each column.  One might be concerned that these large corre- 
lations  are due  exclusively  to the  effect  of durability. We thus  also  ran 
regressions  of the  correlation  between  earnings  (or compensation)  and 
employment  on concentration  and a dummy  that took a value  of one if 
the industry  produces  durable goods.  In the earnings-based  regressions 
both  coefficients  are  significant  at  about  the  20% level  while  in  the 
compensation-based  regressions  they  are both  significant  at under  the 
10% level. 
The  last  two  columns  of  the  table  present  corelations  between  de- 
trended  GNP  and  industry  wages.  The results  are similar to those  ob- 
tained by Barksy and Solon  in that, for both of our measures  of wages, Table 8  RESULTS BASED ON TWO-DIGIT DATA 
a. THE BEHAVIOR OF PRODUCT WAGES 
Correlations  of 
Indus. empl.  Indus. empl.  GNP and  GNP and 
Industry  SIC code  Four-firm  concen.  and hrly. comp.  and hrly. earn.  hrly. comp.  hrly. earn. 
Food  20  0.345  -0.192  -0.155  -0.057  -0.214 
Tobacco  21  0.736  -0.130  -0.099  -0.078  -0.012 
Textiles  22  0.341  -0.174  -0.210  0.107  0.168 
Apparel  23  0.197  -0.388  -0.273  0.440  0.538 
Lumber  24  0.176  -0.383  -0.331  -0.340  -0.236 
Furniture  25  0.216  0.103  0.339  0.206  0.350 
Paper  26  0.312  -0.281  -0.101  0.393  0.267 
Printing  27  0.189  -0.384  -0.353  -0.442  -0.362 
Chemicals  28  0.499  0.260  0.332  0.120  0.038 
Petroleum  29  0.329  -0.114  -0.217  -0.427  -0.422 
Rubber  30  0.691  0.106  0.097  0.421  0.410 
Leather  31  0.245  -0.021  0.141  0.165  0.110 
Stone  and Glass  32  0.374  0.439  0.362  0.023  0.148 
Primary metals  33  0.429  0.039  -0.114  0.353  0.315 
Fabricated metals  34  0.291  0.309  0.275  -0.423  -0.411 
Non-Electrical Machinery  35  0.363  -0.268  -0.273  0.443  0.447 
Electrical Machinery  36  0.450  0.060  0.154  0.407  0.639 
Motor Vehicles  371  0.808  0.530  0.512  0.489  0.603 
Other transportation  eqp.  372-9  0.501  0.185  0.040  -0.243  0.116 
Instruments  38  0.478  -0.151  -0.072  0.458  0.636 
Correlations  with  C4  0.523  0.420  0.343  0.372  0.523  0.420  0.343  0.372  Correlations with  C4 b. THE BEHAVIOR OF MEASURED MARKUPS 
Correlations  of 
Indus. empl. and  Indus. empl. and  GNP and  GNP and 
Industry  SIC code  comp.-based  markup  earn.-based  markup  comp.-based  markup  earn.-based  markup 
Food  20  -0.612  -0.551  -0.124  -0.019 
Tobacco  21  -0.172  -0.256  -0.223  -0.365 
Textiles  22  -0.868  -0.829  -0.613  -0.644 
Apparel  23  -0.387  -0.561  0.336  0.122 
Lumber  24  -0.325  -0.399  -0.420  -0.524 
Furniture  25  -0.875  -0.904  -0.201  -0.265 
Paper  26  -0.954  -0.942  0.395  0.417 
Printing  27  -0.845  -0.845  -0.159  -0.167 
Chemicals  28  -0.971  -0.968  0.175  0.178 
Petroleum  29  -0.718  -0.657  0.108  0.148 
Rubber  30  -0.454  -0.439  -0.448  -0.420 
Leather  31  -0.878  -0.884  0.378  0.372 
Stone and Glass  32  -0.878  -0.859  -0.210  -0.271 
Primary metals  33  -0.767  -0.707  -0.208  -0.192 
Fabricated metals  34  -0.822  -0.776  0.099  0.133 
Non-Electrical Machinery  35  -0.687  -0.678  -0.221  -0.180 
Electrical Machinery  36  -0.979  -0.981  0.120  0.050 
Motor Vehicles  371  -0.319  -0.280  -0.579  -0.619 
Other transportation  eqp.  372-9  0.095  0.229  -0.085  -0.403 
Instruments  38  -0.164  -0.232  -0.343  -0.534 
Correlations  with C4  0.434  0.477  -0.409  -0.416  Correlations with  C4  0.434  0.477  -0.409  -0.416 110 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
concentrated  sectors  tend  to have  higher  real product  wages  in booms. 
Moreover,  some  unconcentrated  industries,  such  as lumber  and  wood 
products  (SIC 24) and fabricated metals industries  (SIC 34), actually have 
lower real product wages  in booms. 
We now  consider  sectoral  markup  variations.  To construct  series  of 
markup variations,  we  need  to have estimates  of the average markup ,u 
in each  sector.  We use  Hall's  (1988a) estimates  for this purpose.  These 
estimates  are quite  substantial  in certain cases  so that,  sometimes, JL*SK 
exceeds  1. As is apparent from (3.3), this means  that the functional form 
(2.1) cannot adequately  capture the presence  of fixed costs in these indus- 
tries (more  than  all of employment  would  have  to be devoted  to fixed 
costs).  This  ceases  to  be  an  issue  if we  consider  instead  a production 
function  given  by 
Yt =  F(K,, ztHt) -  t  (5.1) 
with the fixed costs  Pt growing  at rate of trend output.  In this section we 
will assume  that the elasticity  of substitution  of capital for labor equals 
one.  Proceeding  as in Section 3, the deviation  of the markup from trend 
is then given  by 
,t-=  -  yt  -  1  +  -  )  +  (  s  t  (5.2) 
where  the i superscript  denotes  that the variable corresponds  to sector i. 
To construct  these  markups  we  used  sectoral detrended  data on  value 
added,  the  value  added  deflator,  total  hours,  and  our  two  indices  of 
nominal  wages. 
The  first  question  we  ask  is  whether  concentrated  industries  have 
more  variable  markups  than  unconcentrated  industries.  This  would 
seem  to  be  suggested  by  our  implicit  collusion  model,  though,  in  its 
simplest  form, that model  does  not account for the large observed  aver- 
age markups  in certain unconcentrated  sectors.  We thus  computed  the 
variance  of  ,  for each  sector.  The correlations  of  these  variances  with 
concentration  are 0.084  and  0.086  for the  compensation  and  earnings 
based  markups,  respectively.  These  correlations  are small,  suggesting 
that our measurement  technique  makes even  the markups in unconcen- 
trated sectors quite volatile.  However,  concentrated  sectors have at least 
slightly  more volatility  in the markups than unconcentrated  ones. 
More relevant  than variability is how  markups are related to changes 
in  employment  and  GNP. Reductions  in  markups  are associated  with 
outward  shifts  in labor demand.  So, ignoring  variations in labor supply 
and in market real wages,  one would  expect large levels  of employment 
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tion. In the implicit collusion  model,  these increases in employment  and 
reductions  in markups  would  of course be attributable to low values  of 
X/Y. 
In the  first two  columns  of Table 8b, it is apparent  that the negative 
correlation of employment  with markups is a feature of all sectors. More- 
over,  the  numbers  reported  at  the  bottom  suggest  that  this  negative 
correlation  is not  more  pronounced  in  concentrated  sectors.  There are 
various  possible  explanations  for these  correlations.  They  might  result 
from the  use  of upwardly  biased  estimates,  particularly for unconcen- 
trated sectors,  of  u* in  (5.2).  The existence  of such  systematic  biases  is 
suggested  by absence  of any significant  correlation between  Hall's esti- 
mates of  L*  and concentration. 
Another  possibility  is that there exist hours variations that are not due 
to markup variations  or technology  shocks.  These could be due either to 
measurement  error or to changes  in labor demand  due  for instance  to 
changes  in distortionary  taxation. Whatever the source of these  changes 
in employment,  Equation (5.2) implies  that they will be negatively  corre- 
lated with  constructed  markups.  These  considerations  suggest  that we 
should  consider  instead  the correlation of constructed industry markups 
with  aggregate  GNP. As long  as the measurement  error in employment 
is industry  specific,  i.e.,  not  correlated  with  GNP, measurement  error 
should  not pose  a problem for the interpretation of correlations of mark- 
ups with  GNP. 
Furthermore,  even  if there  are other  sources  of markup variation (or 
more generally  of sectoral labor demand  shifts) we are mainly interested 
in  whether  the  models  describe  the  covariation  of  markups  with  the 
business  cycle.  Finally,  according  to  the  implicit  collusion  model  in- 
creases in aggregate  demand  raise output  by lowering  markups in rela- 
tively  concentrated  sectors.  Thus,  they  should  have  less  effect  on  the 
output  of  unconcentrated  sectors.  This  suggests  that  the  correlations 
between  markups  and  GNP  are less  affected  by  spuriously  high  esti- 
mates of ,*  in unconcentrated  sectors. 
We thus  study  whether  markups in concentrated  industries  fall more 
in booms  than do markups in less concentrated  industries.  It is apparent 
in the  last two  columns  of Table 8a that they  do.  Indeed,  the negative 
correlation of concentration  with  the correlation of markups and GNP is 
slightly stronger than the positive  correlation between  concentration and 
the correlation between  real product wages  and GNP. 
5.2 MARKUP  EQUATIONS  FOR  SECTORAL  DATA 
In  this  section  we  test  the  implicit  collusion  model  more  sharply  by 
estimating  markup  equations  for the  various  two-digit  industries.  The 112 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
essence  of this estimation  procedure  is the construction  of sectoral prox- 
ies for  ft. The proxies  we  construct are limited in that, for simplicity and 
given  the  data limitations,  they  hold  expected  rates of return constant. 
We also ignore the impact of expected  future ,  on x. We focus instead on 
the  fact  that  different  sectors  expect  their  future  sales  to  evolve 
differently. 
We thus  focus  on only  the first term of (4.9) and seek  to construct an 
estimate  for 
Xt =  E  Yt++1  (5.3) 
j=0 
To obtain this estimate  we  use  the fact that current aggregate  GNP con- 
tains different  information  about the future course of output  (which we 
treat here as sales) in different  sectors.  We thus start by running  regres- 
sions  of an industry's  future  output  on  its current output  and  current 
aggregate  GNP. In other words  we run regressions  of the form 
Y = c1y -l  +i  +  vt  (5.4) 
where  the unsuperscripted  y represents  aggregate GNP and At  is a resid- 
ual. We also run a regression  of the form 
t =  C3Yt-1  +  Vt  (5.5) 
where  vt  is a residual.  As long as 8c3 and 8c are less than one, the Hansen 
and Sargent  (1980) prediction  formulas  then  imply  that x in (5.3) is ap- 
proximately  equal to 
y  -  &2C3Yt 
Xt=  5  +  (5.6) 
1-8c  (1  -  8c)(l  -  c) 
We then run regressions  of the industry's  markup if  on its xt proxy and 
its output Yt. The coefficients  in these  regressions  are ex and Ey,  respec- 
tively.  We  estimate  these  regressions  for  our  20  industries  simulta- 
neously  by GLS. Rather than let each industry  have  its own  coefficient 
we assume  that ex and Ey  are linear functions  of concentration.  Thus e6 = 
ex + e2xC4i  and  y = 4  + eyC4'  where C4'  is the four-firm concentration ratio 
for industry  i.  We estimate  these  regressions  for our two  measures  of 
wages  and for 8 equal to both 0.9 and 0.6. The results of estimating  these 
equations  are reported  in the first four rows  of Table 9, where  we  also Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  *  113 
report standard errors that are not explicitly corrected for the presence  of 
serial correlation. 
The results  for our two measures  of wages  are essentially  identical.  In 
all cases,  the coefficients  on concentration  have the sign predicted by the 
implicit collusion  model.  In more concentrated  sectors,  both higher val- 
ues of x and higher values of 9 raise the markup more, so that both ex and 
Ey  are more likely to be positive.  When 8 (which now applies to yearly data 
so that it should  be lower) is 0.9, the estimate  of Ex  is positive  only if the 
concentration  ratio exceeds  0.18,  whereas  Ey is negative  whenever  the 
concentration  ratio exceeds  one-half.  A lower value of 8 raises the abso- 
lute value  of all coefficients.  However,  interestingly,  the cutoff levels  of 
concentration  for which  ex and Ei change  sign do not change  much. 
Note  that,  in the  context  of these  markup equations,  a high  sectoral 
output  depresses  markups  more in concentrated  sectors,  while  this was 
not true of sectoral employment  in Table 8b. In common  with the results 
in that table, regressions  of markups  on sectoral output  leaving  out our 
measure  of x also  have  more positive  coefficients  in more concentrated 
sectors.  This  apparent  discrepancy  is  due  to  the  fact that x and  y are 
more positively  correlated in more concentrated  sectors. In other words, 
when  we  run a regression  of xi on  ' and allow the coefficient to depend 
linearly on concentration,  the coefficient  is higher in more concentrated 
sectors. 
5.3 DEMAND  CONDITIONS  AND PRICING:  INDUSTRY  CASE 
STUDIES 
In  this  subsection,  we  briefly  discuss  two  industry  case  studies  that 
provide  anecdotal  evidence  of possible  use in distinguishing  among  the 
Table  9  MARKUP  EQUATIONS  FOR  CROSS  SECTION  OF SECTORS 
Equations  explaining markups 
with x and y  EX  ex  Ey  Ey 
Compensation  data  -0.117  0.624  -0.357  0.733 
(0.0007)a  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.064) 
Earnings  data  -0.101  0.603  -0.394  0.839 
(0.0007)  (0.184)  (0.032)  (0.067) 
Compensation  data  -0.317  1.458  -0.633  1.781 
8~=0.  6 ~(0.037)  (0.082)  (0.068)  (0.145) 
Earnings  data  -0.287  1.571  -0.636  2.097 
(0.040)  (0.088)  (0.075)  (0.156) 
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theories of pricing presented  above.26 One advantage  of considering  case 
studies  of  this  kind  is  that  they  allow  us  to  focus  on  more  narrowly 
defined  markets  than in the analysis  of industry  data above; hence  the 
market structure (clearly oligopolistic  in both of the cases discussed  here) 
can be better identified.  Another  is that a wider range of types  of infor- 
mation  about  the  possible  determinants  of  industry  pricing  can  be 
brought  to bear. 
5.3.1  The Baby Food Industry 1958-1974  The  U.S.  market  for  canned 
baby foods  and cereals was a classic oligopoly;  in 1972, the three largest 
producers  (Gerber, Beech-Nut,  and Heinz)  accounted  for 91% of indus- 
try sales.27 Buyers' concern  for quality control and nutritional expertise 
allowed  this  small  group  of producers,  who  spent  large sums  on  their 
image  of reliability, to  dominate  the  market.  Nonetheless,  demand  re- 
mained  somewhat  price sensitive;  "Gerber brand baby foods  [the indus- 
try leader] could  sell for a penny  or so more at retail than other brands 
(an 11% premium),  differentials  beyond  this could  shift customer  pur- 
chases  to other brands."28 
This market provides  an interesting  case study of the effects of a large 
change in expectations  regarding the future growth of demand.  The U.S. 
birth rate grew  sharply  during  the  1950s,  reaching  a peak  number  of 
births of 4.3 million  in 1957. This resulted  in corresponding  strong sales 
of canned  baby food  throughout  the decade.  During the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, producers  expected  this growth  trend to continue.  In 1958, 
the  marketing  department  of Gerber Products  had  forecast  that births 
would  increase to 4.4 million per year by 1965, and to 5.1 million per year 
by 1970.29  Instead,  the rate of births fell throughout  the 1960s and early 
1970s, to only 3.75 million by 1965, and to fewer than 3.5 million by the 
early  1970s.  Hence  by  the  late  1960s,  not  only  had  sales  of baby food 
declined  from those  of the early  1960s, but it had become  evident  that 
demand  would  continue  to contract for several more years. 
Under such circumstances,  the alternative models  of markup determi- 
nation  imply  different  responses.  According  to the static model,  future 
sales  expectations  have  no  effect  on  current  markups.  If the  effect  of 
current sales  on  markups  is countercyclical,  then  the declining  sales  of 
the late 1960s should  have  meant  increased  markups.  According  to the 
customer  market model,  firms should  cease to hold prices down  for the 
26. We would like to thank Rob Gertner  for drawing  our attention  to these materials,  and 
for helpful discussions of the cases. 
27. Harrigan  and Porter  (1982,  p. 7 and Exhibit  4). 
28. Ibid.  (p. 4). 
29. Ibid.  (p. 3 and Exhibit  1), citing Gerber's  1958  Annual  Report. Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  * 115 
sake of maintaining  market share, and instead raise prices to increase the 
revenues  obtained  from  current  customers.  According  to  the  implicit 
collusion  model,  instead,  collusion  should  become  more difficult to sus- 
tain, so that markups should  fall. In fact, price competition  intensified  in 
the industry, with  price wars breaking out in 1968 and continuing,  sepa- 
rated by periods  of temporary truce, until July 1974. H.J. Heinz (the third 
largest  producer)  took  the  lead  in  cutting  prices,  with  the  other  firms 
forced to respond;  Heinz  succeeded  by this means  in raising its market 
share.30 
There  are,  of  course,  several  ways  of  accounting  for the  price cuts. 
One  might  simply  postulate  a static model  of procyclical  markups,  or 
even  argue  that marginal  costs  fell sharply  due  to low  utilization.  Still, 
the  revision  of  producers'  expectations  of  future  sales  growth  would 
seem  to have  been  a more  dramatic change  than the decline  in current 
sales itself,  and the effect  seems  not to have been  at all consistent  with 
the prediction  of the customer  market model,  while  it looks very much 
like a breakdown  of oligopolistic  collusion. 
5.3.2  The Electrical  Equipment  Conspiracy  1948-1962  The U.S. market for 
large turbine  generators  of electricity was  dominated  by two  large pro- 
ducers,  General Electric with  an average  market share of 61% over this 
period,  and Westinghouse  with an average market share of 32%. A third 
producer,  Allis-Chalmers,  that  left  the  market at the  end  of  1962,  ac- 
counted  for most  of the  rest.31 There exists  considerable  evidence  sug- 
gesting  collusive  pricing in this industry.  An antitrust suit concluded  in 
1962 led  to  the  imprisonment  of  seven  industry  executives  for fixing 
prices in this and other markets. 
Despite  this,  collusion  was  far from perfect. Government-owned  utili- 
ties  bought  through  sealed  bids.  Investor-owned  utilities  negotiated 
with  manufacturers'  salesmen  but  without  revealing  to  one  producer 
what  its rivals had bid.  The diffusion  of information  about pricing poli- 
cies was  also hampered  by the customization  of generators  to particular 
specifications  and by the inclusion  of spare parts and accessories  in the 
bid. Each manufacturer  had a "price book" that allowed  a "book price" 
to  be  computed  for  a  given  generator,  and  these  books  were  public 
information.  But,  the  computation  often  allowed  room  for interpreta- 
tion,  due  to  the  many  possible  options,  and  the  price  quoted  could 
involve  a discount  that varied  from customer  to customer.  GE acted as 
"price leader," with competitors  matching  its book prices. The discount- 
30. Ibid.  (pp. 9-10). 
31. Porter  and Ghemawat  (1986,  p. 6). 116 - ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
ing policies  of the three producers  differed, however,  with GE tending to 
negotiate  a  more  consistent  discount  from  the  book  price,  while  the 
discounts  of Westinghouse  and  Allis-Chalmers  varied  more  with  com- 
petitive  circumstances.32 
Both quantities  ordered and average prices varied greatly from year to 
year  (Fig.  5).33 The  cyclical  variation  in  orders  was  apparently  due  to 
variation in utilities'  forecasts  of peak electricity demand.  Forecasts had 
to be made far in advance,  due to the delay involved  in engineering  and 
construction  of the customized  generator, and in installation by the util- 
ity (a total of 2.5 to 3 years on average,  between  the order and the unit's 
coming  on-line),  while  purchasing  capacity  before  it was  needed  was 
costly  due both to the large capital outlay involved  and to rapid techno- 
logical  progress  in  generator  design.  Utilities'  expectations  moved  to- 
gether,  both  because  of common  dependence  on the national  economy 
and the attention  that utility executives  paid to each others' forecasts.34 
Average  prices  clearly move  countercyclically  with  respect  to orders: 
they  fall in 1950 (a peak year for orders),  rise to a peak in 1953-1954  (a 
cyclical trough  in orders),  fall in 1955 (the beginning  of a new  period of 
high  demand),  rise until  a new  peak  in late 1957 and in 1958 (the next 
cyclical trough  in orders),  and then  fall until late 1960 (the beginning  of 
another  high-demand  period).  This  suggests  increased  competition  in 
periods  of  temporarily  high  demand,  consistent  with  the  static model 
(with  procyclical  elasticity  of demand)  or the implicit  collusion  model, 
but  not  with  the  customer  market  model.  Because  one  observes  such 
countercyclical  pricing in an industry  with unusually  cyclical demand,  it 
is tempting  to conclude  that the temporary character of the variations in 
orders plays an important  role in generating  the variations in the degree 
of price competition,  in which  case  the implicit collusion  model  would 
seem  to fit the case best. 
Because  of the long  time involved  in engineering  and construction  (a 
year  to  18 months,  even  without  delays  due  to  order  backlogs),  the 
periods  of  high  demand  were  followed  by  periods  of  1 to  2 years  in 
which  order backlogs  were  large even  if few  new  orders were  taken.  It 
was during these  periods  of large order backlogs and hence high rates of 
capacity utilization  that prices rose.35 One  might  thus  argue that prices 
rise and fall with marginal cost of production,  which,  in turn, varies with 
the degree  of capacity utilization.  Such an interpretation of the industry 
32. Ibid. (pp.  1, 3, 4, 6). 
33. Ibid. (Exhibit 3, taken from briefs filed in connection  with a subsequent  lawsuit  by one 
of GE's customers). 
34. Ibid. (p. 3). 
35. Ibid. (Exhibit 4). Figure 5 TURBINE GENERATOR ORDERS AND  BACKLOGS (KILOWATTS)  AND  INDEX OF 
ORDER PRICES. 
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cycles, however, requires  considerable  myopia on the part of producers. 
When competing for orders, producers should calculate  their marginal 
cost on the basis of the anticipated  level of capacity  utilization  in produc- 
tion when the orders are to be filled, not at the time that the orders are 
taken. Hence the high-demand periods should have been periods in 
which firms, foreseeing a high level of capacity  utilization  in the follow- 
ing 2 years, would have charged  high prices (had markups  not been cut). 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented several sources of evidence that suggest that markup 
variations  at cyclical  frequencies  might be due to changes in the ability  to 
collude over time. These markup  variations  are partially  responsible for 
fluctuations in activity because they affect the demand for labor. How- 
ever, we have not measured the extent to which shocks that affect the 
degree of implicit collusion are responsible for fluctuations  in economic 
activity.  For that, a structural  model with an explicit  identification  of the 
source of all disturbances is required. Such a structural  model would 
include all the equilibrium  conditions involved in the determination  of 
markups, employment, output, investment, asset prices, wages, and so 
on. Our attempt here to estimate markup  equations has repeatedly had 
to face issues of simultaneity and of the possible existence of various 
unobserved disturbances, and a satisfactory  resolution of these prob- 
lems requires  a complete structural  model. For  example, the implications 
for the markup equation of observed comovements of markups and 
stock prices depend, among other things, on how adjustment  costs (cap- 
tured in our model by Xt) respond to shocks that move markups and 
stock prices. This can be analyzed only in the context of a joint model of 
investment and markup  determination  (like that considered  by Chirinko 
and Fazzari, 1990). 
The construction of a structural  model will allow us to assess which 
demand disturbances  affect the markup  (and labor  demand) through X/ 
Y, the ratio of expected future profitability  to current  sales. One set of 
demand variables that appears to affect output is that associated with 
changes in the stocks of certain  liquid assets. There are several possible 
mechanisms through which changes in these assets might affect the 
economy. One of these is the existence of nominal rigidities. The exis- 
tence of such rigidities is compatible  with the models presented above. 
Consider  first models in which labor  contracts  are imperfectly  indexed 
with firms free to chose employment ex post as in Fischer (1977) and 
Taylor  (1980). These can easily be accommodated by our model. With 
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demand  and the markup Equation (2.19) would  continue  to apply. Fur- 
thermore,  endogenous  countercyclical  variation in markups  would  im- 
prove the empirical adequacy  of the model in at least two respects.  First, 
it would  allow  monetary  surprises  to expand  output  without  reducing 
real wages.  Second,  it would  increase the elasticity of output response  to 
monetary  surprises  for any given  indexation  of contracts and any given 
fraction of  the  work  force covered  by  the  contracts.  A general  equilib- 
rium model  with nominal  contracting and endogenous  markup determi- 
nation  should  provide  firmer foundations  for the  sort of  specification 
used by Taylor (1980) (which involves  an ad hoc "markup pricing" rule). 
It should  also  improve  the  empirical  adequacy  of  the  kind  of  general 
equilibrium  model  with  nominal  wage  contracts  considered  by  King 
(1990) and Cho and Cooley  (1990). 
Now  consider  models  with  nominal  price  rigidity.  Impediments  to 
price flexibility such as costs of changing  prices affect the markup equa- 
tion directly, so that they require a bigger modification  of the models  we 
have  considered.  However,  as we  suggested  in the introduction,  those 
models  are  broadly  complementary  to  the  implicit  collusion  model. 
Prices may be low  in booms  both because  raising prices would  raise the 
temptation  to cheat too much  and because  firms are reluctant to change 
prices. Combining  the two mechanisms  may be desirable for the reasons 
stressed  in Ball and Romer (1990). Countercyclical markups act as a real 
rigidity, which  may  magnify  the importance  of relatively  small costs  of 
changing  prices. 
APPENDIX  1: THE  EFFECT  OF  AGGREGATE 
DEMAND  ON THE  LABOR  MARKET  IN 
COMPETITIVE  MODELS 
In this  Appendix  we  examine  some  possible  competitive  explanations 
for procyclical real wages  in response  to demand  shocks.  The first candi- 
date applies  only  to the case of military purchases  discussed  in Rotem- 
berg and Woodford (1989) and in Section 2. In this case, real wages  could 
rise because  labor supply  to the private sector falls as a result of conscrip- 
tion.  GNP could  nonetheless  rise as a result of the increase in the value 
added produced  by the government  sector. For the period after 1929, we 
know  that this  is not  the  explanation;  private value  added  and private 
employment  both  rise together  with  the increase in military purchases. 
Thus  the  increased  real wage  must  be  reconciled  with  an  increase  in 
private labor demand. 
The next two candidates  rely on the assumption  that changes in aggre- 
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The first variant has labor supply  increasing  and expansions  due to real 
wage  declines  in  every  sector.  However,  these  reductions  might, be 
masked  in  the  average  real earnings  series  because  high-wage  sectors 
expand  more.  This lack of proportionality  in the expansion  of different 
sectors  might  be due  to greater elasticity  of factor substitution  in high- 
wage  sectors  with  the  same  degree  of real wage  decline  in all sectors. 
This explanation  does  not seem  sufficient  because,  as shown  by Barsky 
and  Solon  (1989) as well  as by some  of our empirical work reported  in 
Section  7,  there  are  many  sectors  where  real  product  wages  expand 
together with  output. 
The second  sectoral story has workers  increasing  their effort because 
the  wage  deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index  rises.  On  the  other 
hand,  not  all  sectors  expand.  Certain  sectors  face  an  increase  in  the 
relative price for the good  that they  sell so that their real product wage 
falls.  By contrast,  other  sectors  face increased  real product  wages  and 
their  output  and  employment  fall.  As  long  as  the  sectors  whose  real 
product  wages  fall are very  labor intensive  so  that they  expand  their 
employment  substantially,  the net effect can be an increase in aggregate 
employment.  One  can  check  some  of  the  explanatory  power  of  this 
variant  by  seeing  how  relative  prices  respond  to  what  are  arguably 
changes  in aggregate  demand,  and  how  this is related to the  differen- 
tial effect on output  and employment  in different sectors.  This is some- 
thing  we  hope  to address  in future research.  However,  the explanation 
does  not seem  a promising  one,  because,  as in the previous  case,  there 
are  not  too  many  important  sectors  where  the  real  product  wage  is 
countercyclical.  Nor  are there  many  sectors  where  sectoral output  and 
employment  are countercyclical. 
A third category  of competitive  explanations  is based on the idea that 
capital utilization  varies  with  aggregate  demand.  Thus  the production 
function  is 
Yt = F[utKt,  zt(Ht -  Ht)]  (A. 1) 
where  Yt, Kt, Ht, and  ut represent  output,  capital input,  hours  worked, 
and capital utilization  at t, respectively.  The variables zt and Ht represent 
the state of labor augmenting  technical progress and fixed costs at t, as in 
(2.1). It is then argued that, while  Kt  is predetermined  at t, utKt  may vary. 
However,  such a model  is incomplete  unless  it also explains why  capital 
is not always  fully utilized.  Moreover,  the cyclical behavior of real wages 
depends  critically on  the  particular explanation  that is  chosen  for the 
partial utilization  of capital. 
One variant based  on Lucas (1970) has a longer "workweek of capital" Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  *  121 
in booms  as  firms  employ  additional  shifts  and  more  overtime  hours. 
According  to this variant, the defect of (2.1) is not so much that capital is 
predetermined  but that different  hours  (straight time,  overtime,  second 
shift,  etc.)  are not  perfect  substitutes.  What is needed  is a production 
function  like (A.5)  in Appendix  2, where  different  hours  are imperfect 
substitutes  because  they  use  capital at different times.  With such a pro- 
duction  function,  there  are  separate  demand  curves  for  the  different 
types of labor. However,  firms are induced  to hire more hours of any one 
type only if the real wage  for that type of labor input falls. This does  not 
explain  how  real wages  can  rise  together  with  output  when  demand 
increases.  In fact, as Appendix  2 shows,  this type of production  function 
actually increases  the extent to which countercyclical markups are needed 
to account for the observed  cyclical behavior of average real wages. 
An alternative  capital utilization  story assumes  that capital utilization 
is  choice  variable,  which  is  independent  from  hours  worked.  In  this 
story,  full  utilization  is  costly  because  it implies  more  rapid deprecia- 
tion  of  the  capital  stock.  Suppose  that capital accumulation  obeys  the 
relation 
Kt+  =  [1 -  (ut)]Kt +  f(Y 
-  Ct)  (A.2) 
where  8 is the depreciation  rate which  is increasing and convex in u and 
Yt -  Ct represent  investable  resources  at time t. In the absence of adjust- 
ment costs, f(x) = x, so that gross capital accumulation is simply equal to 
the  difference  between  output  and  consumption.  In  the  presence  of 
adjustment  costs, f is increasing  and concave.  Substituting  for Yt  in (A.2) 
and differentiating  with  respect to ut, we obtain 
f  F1 -  6' = 0.  (A.3) 
This equation  simply  says  that firms must end up with the same capital 
stock if they marginally increase current utilization and use the resulting 
increased output  for investment  purposes.  If such a modification  of utili- 
zation raised future capital, it would  be strictly profitable; if it lowered  it, 
the firm would  gain from lowering  its utilization. 
We consider  first the case without  adjustment  costs.  Then (A.3) does 
not depend  on the state of aggregate  demand.  An increase in aggregate 
demand  does  not,  by itself,  change  u so  that it has  no  direct effect  on 
labor demand.  Insofar as,  for other  reasons,  the  increase  in aggregate 
demand  raises employment,  it does  raise the marginal product of capital 
so that equilibrium  utilization  does  rise.  If the production  function  F is 
homogeneous  of degree one,  F, depends  on the ratio of zt(Ht  -  Ht) to utKt. 122 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
Then,  (A.3)  implies  that  utilization  is  a function  of z,(Ht-Ht)/Kt. This 
gives  rise to the reduced-form  production  function 
Yt = F[K,, z,(H, -  Ht)] =  [u(  (H  Ht) )Kt, zt(Ht -  Ht)].  (A.4) 
Our analysis  in the  text uses  this reduced-form  production  function  F, 
which  inherits  homogeneity  of degree  one  from F. Thus our analysis  is 
consistent  with variations  in capital utilization. 
We now  turn to the case where  there are adjustment  costs  so that f is 
concave  and  f'  falls  when  investment  is  large.  This  means  that  those 
conditions  that raise investment  must lower  5', so that they must lower 
the equilibrium  value  of capital utilization.  In this case,  the  forces that 
raise investment  also lower  labor demand  for any given  real wage.  The 
close  link  between  utilization  and  investment  is easily  understood.  A 
low rate of capital utilization  is a form of investment,  so it should  occur 
whenever  the firm is generally  trying to increase its future capital stock. 
When  the  government  increases  its  spending,  real  interest  rates 
should  rise and  investment  fall. As we  show  in Rotemberg and Wood- 
ford (1989), this is indeed  what  seems  to happen  following  increases  in 
military purchases.  In the presence  of adjustment  costs,  this raises f' so 
that capital utilization  and labor demand  rise as well.  So this model  can 
explain why  real wages  rise with increases in military spending.  But this 
model  has  a very  strong  implication.  It says  that,  for fixed f' and fixed 
technology  F,  labor  demand  moves  inversely  with  investment.  This 
would  seem  to be somewhat  problematic,  since  investment  is procycli- 
cal. Moreover,  the change  in real wages  is positively  correlated with the 
change  in real investment  spending  (in general,  though  not  following 
increases  in  military  purchases).  Of  course,  one  might  want  to  know 
how  investment  can  be  procyclical  in  a competitive  model  with  fixed 
technologies  F and f.  In the  presence  of adjustment  costs,  investment 
can rise when  firms expect  conditions  to warrant high  capital stocks in 
the  future.  Thus,  investment  demand  should  rise if firms anticipate  a 
high marginal product of capital in the future or high labor supply  in the 
future.  But the  model  with  varying  utilization  that we  have  presented 
would  not allow  these  increases  in investment  demand  to translate into 
increases  in labor demand. 
However,  there could also be technological  reasons why investment  is 
procyclical.  Investment  would  rise  whenever  the  marginal  product  of 
capital  F1 rises  and  when  the  cost  of  adjustment  f'  falls.  Greenwood, 
Hercowitz  and  Huffman  (1988) present  a model  with  exogenous  varia- Markups  and  the  Business  Cycle  * 123 
tions  in f'.  These  are not  treated  as  changes  in  adjustment  costs  but, 
equivalently,  as changes  in the productivity  of new  capital relative to old 
capital.  As  they  show,  these  changes  in f'  induce  sympathetic  move- 
ments  in output,  investment,  and labor demand. 
The  model  of  varying  capital  utilization  thus  is  able  to  resolve  our 
empirical puzzles  only  in the case of a rather special form of the model 
(involving  both depreciation-in-use  and significant costs of adjusting the 
capital stock) and  a very  special  type  of aggregate  demand  shock.  Nei- 
ther  the  importance  of  depreciation-in-use  nor  the  particular type  of 
investment  demand  shocks needed  can be directly measured in any very 
obvious  way; hence  credence in this particular resolution will depend  on 
further empirical study  of a rather subtle kind. 
APPENDIX  2: OVERTIME  AND MARGINAL  COST 
In  this  Appendix,  we  consider  the  effects  of  variation  in  the  use  of 
overtime hours on our calculation of marginal cost. We first consider the 
effect of letting straight time and overtime hours be imperfect substitutes 
(as in  Hansen  and  Sargent,  1988) and  then  the  effect  of  an  allocative 
overtime  premium  (as in Bils, 1987). 
Hansen  and Sargent assume  that the two types of hours are used with 
the  same  capital stock  at different  times  with  the  same  Cobb-Douglas 
production  function  so that total output  is 
Yt =  Kt[zt(Hlt  -  Ht)1-a  +  Kt[ZtH2t]l 
where Hit and H2t  represent  straight-time and overtime hours at t, respec- 
tively, while  overhead  hours  are assumed  to all be straight-time  hours. 
More generally  we  may suppose  that 
Y=  F{K,  zQ[(Hlt  -  H),  H2}  (A.5) 
where  each  function  F and  Q is homogeneous  of degree  one,  concave, 
and  increasing  in  both  arguments.  This  allows  us  to  nest  both  the 
Hansen-Sargent  specification  (in which  Q is a CES function with elastic- 
ity of substitution  1/a)  and  the  case  of perfect  substitutes  (in which  Q 
simply  adds its two arguments). 
In this case,  corresponding  to (3.1) we have 
ztF2{Kt,  ztQ[(Hlt  -  Ht), H2t]}Q2[(Hlt -  Ht), H2t] 
[-Lt  =  A.6) 
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where  w2t represents  the  real wage  paid  to overtime  hours.  We might 
equivalently  write /t  as the ratio of the marginal product of straight-time 
hours to their cost. However,  in this case it seems likely that the appropri- 
ate costs  include  costs  of varying  the level  of employment.  By contrast 
there probably exist no appreciable adjustment costs for overtime hours.36 
Defining  the average wage  as 
WltHlt  +  W2tH2t 
Wt 
= 
Hlt  +  H2t 
and  assuming  that  the  overtime  premium  (w,Jwlt) does  not  vary  over 
time, one  obtains 
(w, -  w)H,  (w2 -w)H2h  ( 
=2t-'-  )  t  - 
~lt  h].2t  (A.7)  wH  wH 
Also,  letting  it  denote  the percentage  deviation  in total hours, 
hit  -  Hft  -  H2t.  (A.8)  h,,  =Jiflt-I^  .  (A.8) 
Hi  HI 
To obtain an expression  for the deviation  of the markup we proceed as 
before. We log-linearize  the production  function (A.5) and the first-order 
condition  (A.6)  and  combine  the  two  to eliminate  zt. Using  (A.7)  and 
(A.8) this yields 
=e  1-  SK YE+(1  -  e)lS  SK  (+  W,  [W 
-  * 
(1  -  SK)/E121t 
et  K  l  +(  - 
e-  el*sK  e-  e,lu  S  w  1 -  l*Sk 
-  (w2 -  wl)H2 [  *  - a(  K)/12  (A.9) 
E12  wH  1 -  S  Kl, 
This is the analogue  of (3.6) and reduces  to (3.6) if w, =  w2 and  e12  =  . 
If these  conditions  do  not  obtain,  (A.9)  may result in more counter- 
cyclical markups than those implied by (3.6). For example,  setting /*  = 1, 
e = 1, and w, = w2  leads to (3.9) so that, if E12 <  ??  and H2/Ht is procyclical, 
then  ,t  is more countercyclical  than the inverse  of the labor share. 
36. The existence  of adjustment  costs  for straight-time  but not  for overtime  hours  is the 
most  plausible  explanation  for the greater use  of overtime  hours  in booms;  see,  e.g., 
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To gauge  the empirical magnitude  of this effect we  ran regressions  of 
2t  on  it and  ht where  the  hatted  variables  are detrended  logarithms. 
Using  data  for the  U.S.  manufacturing  sector  (the  only  overtime  data 
available)  and  allowing  for an  error with  both  first and  second  order 
serial correlation,  we  obtain 
h2=  7.011t + 2.69h2 
(0.59)  (8.11) 
Period: 1956.III-1989.I 
Ignoring the statistically insignificant  quadratic term, we see that over- 
time hours increase  by 7% whenever  total hours increase by 1%. So, as 
explained  in the  text,  we  can obtain  our baseline  series  assuming  con- 
stant returns as long  as we also assume  that E12 = 6. 
If one  follows  Bils (1987) and assumes  that e12 =  o one has to provide 
an alternative  explanation  for the  use  of overtime  workers.  Bils (1987) 
simply  assumes  that overtime  hours  are a determinate  function  of total 
hours H2 =  V(H). Then,  while  the average wage  is 
V(Ht) 
W1t +  (W2t  -  Wlt) 
Ht 
the marginal wage  (the increase in the wage bill when  total hours rise by 
one unit) is 
Wit +  (W2t -  Wlt)V'(Ht). 
Assuming  again  a constant  overtime  premium,  w2t =  (1 +  p)wlt, the 
percent change  in the marginal wage  for a 1% increase in employment  is 
pV"H2 
H + pV'H 
while  the corresponding  percent change  in the average wage  is 
p(V'H -  V) 
A  H + pV 
The logarithmic  deviation  of the ratio of marginal to average wage,  ut is 
then equal to (yM  -  yA)ht.  Bils then argues that if yM  > yA, the constructed 
markup series is more countercyclical  than the labor share. This method 
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ing  that  the  cost  of  an  additional  straight  time  hour  is  wlt. It thereby 
neglects  the costs  of adding  employees,  which,  presumably,  lies behind 
the  use  of  overtime  hours.  We  adopt  Bils's  method  (i.e.,  we  simply 
subtract A(t  from the right-hand  side of (3.6)) in constructing  the markup 
series used  in the regressions  reported at the end of subsection  4.2. 
If we  interpret  the  above  regression  as  a  second-order  logarithmic 
expansion  of  V(H), the  coefficient  on  hf equals  V'HIV while  the  coeffi- 
cient on h2  equals  one-half  of 
FPV"  V'H  /V'H  2 
+ ,  _. 
V  V  \  V 
Using  these  facts,  together  with  knowledge  that in our data V/H equals 
0.0187, gives  a value  for yM of 0.417 and one for yA of 0.056. As in Bils's 
analysis,  the  former  is  about  eight  times  larger than  the  latter.  Bils's 
estimates  are both  somewhat  larger because  his  index  of  total  hours 
covers only production  hours in manufacturing,  so that his average V/H 
is higher. 
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ago.  I was  an undergraduate  at Princeton,  and  I had just been  taught 
God's  truth about  how  the economy  works.  The IS-LM model  explains 
the  downward-sloping  aggregate  demand  curve.  The  upward-sloping 
aggregate  supply  comes  from the assumption  of a flexible price level and 
a nominal  wage  that is fixed in the short run. 
Armed with  these  powerful  tools of analysis,  I reached the conclusion 
(completely  on my own)  that recessions  must be quite popular.  Sure, a 
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ago.  I was  an undergraduate  at Princeton,  and  I had just been  taught 
God's  truth about  how  the economy  works.  The IS-LM model  explains 
the  downward-sloping  aggregate  demand  curve.  The  upward-sloping 
aggregate  supply  comes  from the assumption  of a flexible price level and 
a nominal  wage  that is fixed in the short run. 
Armed with  these  powerful  tools of analysis,  I reached the conclusion 
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few  people  get  laid  off.  But most  people  get  to  enjoy  the  higher  real 
wages  that result when  prices fall and their nominal  wages  do not. 
So I went  to one of my professors-Alan  Blinder I think it was-to  ask 
him about this. I had the vague  recollection that recessions  were,  in fact, 
politically unpopular,  but this just did not make any sense  to me. If high 
real wages  accompanied  low  employment,  as The General  Theory  and my 
professors  had  taught  me,  then  most  households  should  welcome  eco- 
nomic downturns. 
Well, Professor  Blinder admitted  to me  that real wages  do not move 
countercyclically.  My  conclusion  did  follow  logically  from the  theory  I 
had been  taught as God's  truth, but it just did not fit the facts. It was at 
that  point  that  I decided  to  abandon  macroeconomics.  After all,  how 
could  I trust my  macro textbook  again? If (as a mere  undergraduate)  I 
had managed  to uncover  this big lie, how  many more big lies remained 
undetected?  I decided  to stick to microeconomics. 
As  one  can  see,  my  resolve  weakened  over  time.  Yet I have  never 
stopped  being  disturbed  by the cyclical behavior of the real wage.  Over 
the years,  I have kept my eye on the various ways  this real-wage puzzle 
can be  resolved.  In this  paper,  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  explore  one 
possible  resolution,  suggested  by Rotemberg and Saloner's (1986) earlier 
work  on  supergame  models  of price wars during booms.  I must  admit 
that this Rotemberg-Saloner-Woodford  explanation  of the real wage  at 
first  seems  somewhat  unlikely.  But  it  starts  to  seem  more  appealing 
when  compared  with  the alternatives. 
As far as I know,  there are six ways  to explain the failure of real wages 
to move  countercyclically  over the business  cycle. They are summarized 
in Table 1. None  of these  explanations  commands  a consensus  among 
macroeconomists,  and none  leaves  me completely  satisfied. 
One  explanation  is  that  the  business  cycle  is  driven  by  technology 
shocks,  as in real-business-cycle  models.  When the available technology 
worsens,  the economy  goes into a recession,  and the marginal product of 
labor and the real wage fall. We all have our views about the plausibility of 
Table  1  WHY  AREN'T  REAL  WAGES  COUNTERCYCLICAL?  SIX  ANSWERS 
1. Technology shocks are the source of economic fluctuations. 
2. Implicit  contracts  smooth the real wage over time. 
3. The marginal  product of labor  does not diminish as employment rises. 
4. Firms  set prices based on long-run average cost. 
5. Prices  are about as sticky as nominal wages. 
6. Desired markups  over marginal  cost are countercyclical,  perhaps  because 
oligopolistic  collusion is harder  to maintain  in booms. Comment  *  131 
this story, so I will not discuss  it anymore  here. I will say, however,  that 
this  explanation  may  suffer  from the  opposite  problem  from the  tradi- 
tional  Keynesian  story.  Real-business-cycle  models  tend  to  imply  a 
strongly procyclical real wage.  Although  the real wage is not countercycli- 
cal, it is also not strongly  procyclical. Real-business-cycle  models  appear 
to have  as much  trouble explaining  the real wage  as traditional models. 
A second  hypothesis  is that the  cyclical behavior  of the real wage  is 
meaningless,  because  the  real wage  does  not  reflect the  true shadow 
price  of  labor.  Instead,  implicit  contracts  between  workers  and  firms 
keep the real wage  steady while  the shadow  price fluctuates.  Although  I 
find this view  somewhat  appealing,  I do not know of any direct evidence 
to  support  it.  If this  explanation  were  right,  we  should  observe  more 
cyclical real wages  in industries  with weak attachment between  workers 
and firms. Yet I suspect  that this prediction  is probably just not true. 
A third explanation  of the  real wage  is that the  marginal product  of 
labor does  not diminish  as employment  rises,  so that the labor demand 
curve is horizontal.  As Robert Hall puts  it, marginal cost is "as flat as a 
pancake."  In his  paper  for this  conference,  Hall points  out  that Dorn- 
busch  and Fischer (1990) take this approach  in Chapter 13 of their text- 
book.  Certainly,  if  one  is  willing  to  abandon  the  law  of  diminishing 
returns,  then  it is easy to explain a real wage  that is roughly acyclical. It 
also becomes  easier to explain a variety of other phenomena,  such as the 
failure of the production-smoothing  model  of inventories. 
I personally  find  this  view  a  bit  implausible.  A  flat  labor  demand 
schedule  implies  that if the  government  (or a national  union)  were  to 
raise real wages  by only  a few percent,  employment  would  fall by huge 
amounts,  yet  I think  few  economists  would  predict that outcome.  The 
law of diminishing  returns seems  as sound  an axiom as any on which we 
economists  rely, even  though  it has been out of fashion recently. Dimin- 
ishing  returns,  of course,  leads to downward-sloping  labor demand  and 
upward-sloping  marginal cost. Moreover,  as Mark Bils has emphasized, 
the tendency  of marginal cost to increase during booms  is strengthened 
by firms' increased  reliance on more expensive  overtime labor. 
I am  somewhat  inclined  to  believe  the  view  expressed  in  the  first 
chapter of Dornbusch  and Fischer, which  says,  "A key fact about aggre- 
gate supply  is that it is nonlinear.  At low levels  of output,  prices do not 
change  much....  But  as  the  economy  gets  close  to  full  employ- 
ment  . . .,  further increases  in output will be accompanied  by increased 
prices."  Here  Dornbusch  and  Fischer suggest  that marginal cost is not 
only increasing,  but it is increasing at an increasing rate. This conclusion 
would  follow  naturally if firms have fixed capacity in the short run, and 
if more  firms  hit  their  capacity  in  booms  than  in  recessions.  In other 132 *  MANKIW 
words,  marginal  cost  is  not  as  flat  as  a pancake;  it is  as  curved  as  a 
croissant. 
A fourth explanation  of the real wage,  which  Jim Tobin suggested  to 
me  several  years  ago,  is that firms do not set prices based  on marginal 
cost.  Instead,  they  set prices based  on long-run  average  cost,  which  in 
turn  is  proportional  to  nominal  wages.  If one  followed  Alan  Blinder 
(1991) and  asked  firms why  they  do  what  they  do,  Tobin's hypothesis 
would  likely fare quite well.  The argument against this hypothesis  is that 
it seems  to  require  that  firms not  maximize  profit.  The assumption  of 
profit maximization  is, I suspect,  a fetish that few economists  are willing 
to give up easily. 
A fifth explanation  of the cyclical behavior of the real wage is that prices 
are about as sticky as nominal wages.  As one might guess,  this is the expla- 
nation that I tend to favor. In fact, it was thinking about the real-wage puz- 
zle  that originally  got  me  interested  in thinking  about imperfections  in 
goods  markets and, eventually,  about monopolistically  competitive  firms 
facing  menu  costs  (Blinder  and  Mankiw,  1984; Mankiw,  1985).  Alan 
Blinder's survey evidence  indicates  that the typical firm in the U.S. econ- 
omy changes  its prices about once a year. This is roughly  the time span 
over which many nominal wages  are fixed. So, as I read the evidence,  the 
hypothesis  of equally  sticky wages  and prices seems  fairly attractive. 
The  sixth  and  final  hypothesis,  which  is examined  in  this  paper  by 
Rotemberg and Woodford,  is that the desired markup of prices over mar- 
ginal cost is countercyclical.  This could happen simply because the elastic- 
ity of demand  changes  over the business  cycle. But I share their judgment 
that this seems  unlikely. Instead, if markups fall during booms,  it must be 
that industries  in some  way become  more competitive. 
Deciding  among  these  six explanations  is,  of course,  an empirical is- 
sue,  and  it is exactly  the issue  that Rotemberg  and Woodford take up. 
Their  paper  is  impressive  in  the  way  it  brings  to  bear  a  variety  of 
evidence-time  series,  cross sectional,  and case study-to  provide  sup- 
port for their  model  of  countercyclical  markups.  Yet I am left with  an 
uneasy  feeling  about their interpretation  of the evidence. 
I have  two  reservations.  First, if we  were  to follow  Blinder's strategy 
and ask businessmen  if they behaved  in this way, they would probably tell 
us  that we  were  crazy. The level  of sophistication  in these  supergame 
models  seems just too great to describe realistically how firms set prices. I 
must  admit  that the more I talk to real businessmen-such  as textbook 
publishers-about  how they set their prices, the less compelling I find the 
assumption  of highly  sophisticated,  fully rational, profit maximization. 
My  second  and  perhaps  more  important  reservation  is  that the  evi- 
dence that Rotemberg and Woodford present can, I suspect,  be explained Comment 133 
in other ways.  They present  many pieces  of evidence,  all pointing  in the 
same  direction.  Yet each piece  of evidence  on its own  seems  potentially 
controvertible. 
For example,  they  present  an ingenious  test  in which  they  examine 
how  Tobin's q affects  the  markup.  Yet, as they  point  out,  their method 
for computing  the change  in the markup is closely related to calculations 
of the  Solow  residual.  Therefore,  many  of the  standard problems  with 
interpreting Solow residuals arise here as well. In particular, their calcula- 
tions  would  seem  to be  affected  by  labor hoarding,  by  which  I mean 
unmeasured  variation in workers' effort. 
Similarly, Rotemberg  and  Woodford  report that there  are systematic 
cross-industry  differences  in  the  cyclical  behavior  of  the  real product 
wage.  Those industries  that are more concentrated have more procyclical 
real product wages.  This is an important fact, and their model can explain 
it. But so can other models.  In their 1987 paper, Rotemberg and Saloner 
examine the relative rigidity of monopoly  pricing. They use a menu-cost 
model  to show  that greater concentration  should  lead to stickier prices. 
Naturally, if prices are stickier in highly concentrated industries, real prod- 
uct wages  will tend to be more procyclical. 
In the end,  I remain skeptical of the supergame  model of markups. Yet 
I find it more appealing  than I did before reading this paper. Unlike most 
papers  that I read,  this  one  actually  moved  my  priors.  Countercyclical 
markups may actually be part of the explanation  for why  real wages  are 
not countercyclical.  As long as I get to keep reading papers like this one, 
I will not give up on macroeconomics. 
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Comment 
VALERIE  A. RAMEY 
University  of California,  San Diego and NBER 
1. Introduction 
Rotemberg  and Woodford  present  a thorough  analysis  of the case for a 
collusive  model  of  the  business  cycle.  Their  paper  makes  two  main 
points.  First, they  argue that in order to reproduce  the effects of aggre- 
gate demand  shocks  one needs  to introduce  imperfect competition.  Sec- 
ond,  they  suggest  that the  type  of imperfect  competition  supported  by 
the data is the implicit collusion  model  of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). 
The result  is  a nice  blend  of macroeconomics  and  industrial  organiza- 
tion, in both the theory and empirical work, with extraordinary attention 
to detail. 
One  of  the  real strengths  of  the  paper  is  that instead  of embroiling 
themselves  in the question  "are demand  shocks  or supply  shocks  more 
important,"  Rotemberg  and Woodford,  following  Barro (1981) and Hall 
(1986), focus  on military spending  as a clear shift in aggregate  demand. 
The authors argue that the competitive  model has counterfactual predic- 
tions for the effect of increases  in military spending.  In the competitive 
model,  a temporary increase in defense  spending  increases the real inter- 
est  rate,  which  leads  to  increased  hours  and  output,  and  decreased 
consumption.  The increase  in output  occurs because  of a shift in labor 
supply.  Under  the assumption  of diminishing  returns to labor, and ab- 
sent effects  on the production  function,  real wages  should  fall. 
Rotemberg  and Woodford  suggest  that these  implications  are at odds 
with  the  data.  They  argue  that  real wages  and  consumption,  in  fact, 
increase  in  response  to  an  increase  in  defense  spending,  despite  the 
increase  in hours.  Thus,  defense  spending  cannot  have its effect solely 
through  shifts  in labor supply.  The key  to Rotemberg  and Woodford's 
alternative  model  is that collusive  behavior  that leads  to countercyclical 
markups  allows  aggregate  demand  shocks  to affect labor demand.  The 
augment  is  simple.  Consider  the  following  equation  from their paper: 
FH(Kt,Ht,zt) =  tWt,  (1) 
where  the  left-hand  side  is  the  marginal  product  of labor (H) and  the 
right-hand  side is the product of the markup ji and the real wage w. The 
competitive  model  assumes  that  L is  equal  to  one  and  invariant. 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford's  collusive  model  implies  that  uL  is  greater Comment 135 
than  one,  and  is  countercyclical.  Thus,  in  their model,  an  increase  in 
hours,  which  lowers  the left-hand  side does not mean that the real wage 
must  fall.  Rather,  ,  will  fall.  Hence,  their  model  is  consistent  with  a 
concurrent increase in military spending,  hours, real wages,  output,  and 
consumption. 
To support  their arguments,  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  provide  four 
types  of empirical  results:  (1) the effect  of military spending  on hours, 
output,  consumption,  and real wages,  (2) the cyclicality of the markup, 
(3) tests  of three imperfect  competition  models,  and (4) the relationship 
between  markups  and  concentration  in industries.  I will argue that the 
regularities  in the data that they  cite are not regularities at all, and that 
their measure of the countercyclicality  of the markup is based on implau- 
sible assumptions.  I will address  each of these  in turn. 
2. The  Effects  of  Military  Spending 
Does  military spending  have the effects claimed by the authors? In fact, 
Rotemberg  and Woodford's  own  estimates  do not support  their claims. 
First,  Table 1 of  their  paper  shows  clearly  that  military  spending  de- 
presses  consumption,  since  the  only  significant  coefficient  on  military 
spending  lags is a negative  coefficient and is much larger than the sum of 
the positive  coefficients.  This is the  same  result Hall (1986) found.  Sec- 
ond,  the coefficient  estimates  of the effect of military spending  on hours 
and  wages  and  compensation  are generally  not  significant.  Moreover, 
for a given  lag, the values  of the coefficients  in the hours regression  and 
the  real  compensation  regression  have  opposite  signs,  meaning  that 
military spending  has opposite  effects on the two variables. 
Thus,  the  main  empirical  regularities  the  authors  use  to  argue  that 
imperfect competition  is necessary  are not regularities at all. A competi- 
tive model with more general functional forms for the utility and produc- 
tion functions  could  probably capture most of the movements. 
3. Countercyclical  Markups 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford  calculate markups  using  the Hall methodol- 
ogy, but also allow for overhead  labor. The weakness  of this approach is 
that the cyclical behavior  of the markup depends  crucially on the average 
level  of the markup.  When  the elasticity of substitution  between  capital 
and variable labor is equal  to one  (their baseline  case),  the formula ap- 
pears as follows: 
ft =  -t ~ 
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where  ,i is the cyclical variation in the markup, y is the cyclical variation 
in value  added,  ,*  is the  average  level  of the  markup,  h is the  cyclical 
variation in. hours,  and wz  is the cyclical variation in the wage  rate. f is an 
increasing  function  of /*.  The authors' baseline  case is ,u  =  1.6, imply- 
ing an average markup of 60%. When ,*  =  1.6, f(L*) = 2. Thus, it is not 
surprising  that they  find very countercyclical  markups,  since the coeffi- 
cient  on  the  negative  of hours  is equal  to two.  When  they  allow  for a 
markup of 10%, which  substantially  lowers  the coefficient  on the nega- 
tive of hours,  they find that the markup is actually procyclical. 
Is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  average  markup  is  60%? This 
number is consistent  with Hall's (1988) findings,  but micro studies,  such 
as Bresnahan's  (1981) study  of the  auto  industry,  find  markups  on the 
order of 10%. In fact, in Rotemberg and Woodford's model  a markup of 
1.6 implies  an implausibly  high ratio of overhead  labor to total labor. By 
their Equation  (4.3),  an average  markup of 1.6 implies  that the ratio of 
overhead  labor to total labor exceeds  50%! Simple evidence  suggests  this 
number is too high.  Consider  total employment  in manufacturing minus 
the  employment  of  production  workers  in  manufacturing  (from CITI- 
BASE) as an  upper  bound  on  the  number  of overhead  workers.  (This 
number  is  an  upper  bound,  because  it  shows  clear cyclical variation, 
declining  by 15% during  recessions.)  The ratio of nonproduction  work- 
ers to total employment  in manufacturing  has increased  over time,  but 
has  never  exceeded  30%. If we  consider  20% to be a reasonable  ratio, 
then  the  average  markup  must  be  1.16.  Such a value  corresponds  to a 
value  of f(,*)  of 1.2,  significantly  reducing  the countercyclicality  of the 
markup. 
Let us consider  some  simple  alternative evidence  on the cyclicality of 
the  markup.  From Equation  (2.3) of  the  paper,  we  have  the  following 
relationship  between  profit rates and markups: 
1TT =I  1  _-  ) -FCt  (3) 
't  PtYt 
where  ir is the  ratio of  (after-tax) profits  to the value  of sales,  ,u is the 
markup,  FC is fixed  cost,  and  py is the value  of sales.  It is easy  to see 
from Equation  (3) that in the  absence  of fixed  costs,  procyclical profits 
rates imply that the markup should be procyclical. In fact, profit rates are 
procyclical. Figure 1 shows  quarterly after-tax profit rates in manufactur- 
ing  from 1947:1 to  1990:2 from CITIBASE. Note  that this  series  is from 
reported  profits,  and  is  not  based  on  any  assumptions  about  market 
structure  or  production  functions.  Profit rates  are  clearly  procyclical. Comment 137 
Thus, by Equation (3), the only way to reconcile countercyclical markups 
with  procyclical  profit  rates  is  to  allow  for the  presence  of  significant 
fixed costs. 
To investigate  the  cyclicality  of  the  markup  in  the  presence  of fixed 
costs,  I estimate  the  following  simple  model.  I assume  that fixed costs 
are proportional  to nonproduction  worker employment  in manufactur- 
ing times average hourly earnings  in manufacturing.  (All series are from 
CITIBASE.) This variable is divided  by the value of sales in manufactur- 
ing to capture the last term in Equation (3). I then regress the profit rate 
in manufacturing  on this variable as well as the economywide  unemploy- 
ment rate. The unemployment  rate (U) is meant to capture the cyclicality 
of the markup. If the unemployment  rate enters negatively  in the regres- 
sion,  this  is  an  indication  that  the  markup  is  procyclical;  if  it  enters 
positively,  this  is an indication  that the  markup is countercyclical.  The 
results are given  as follows: 
FCt 
rt =  constant  + trend  -  12.105  --  0.217 Ut  (4) 
PtYt 
(-2.99)  (-2.67) 
R2 =  0.570,  DW = 0.952 
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With an AR(1) correction: 
FCt 
rt = constant  +  trend  -  39.645  -  0.009 Ut  (5) 
PtYt 
(-4.80)  (-0.10) 
R2 =  0.609,  DW =  2.002, p = 0.848 
The simple  OLS estimates  given  in Equation (4) indicate that the unem- 
ployment  rate enters  negatively,  suggesting  procyclical  markups.  There 
is,  however,  substantial  serial  correlation,  so  Equation  (5) reports  the 
estimates  with  an AR(1) correction.  Here,  the coefficient  on unemploy- 
ment is still negative,  but indistinguishable  from zero.  Thus,  these  esti- 
mates imply an acyclical markup.  These results are only suggestive,  but 
coupled  with  the  arguments  above  on  the  size  of the average  markup, 
they  cast doubt  on  Rotemberg  and  Woodford's  finding  of pronounced 
countercyclicality  of the markup. 
4. Tests  of the  Collusive  Theory 
The  main  implication  of  the  implicit  collusion  hypothesis  is  that  the 
markup  should  increase  when  future  profitability  increases,  and  de- 
crease  when  current  output  increases.  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  test 
their theory  against  two  competing  theories  (monopolistic  competition 
and customer markets) by estimating  the relationship between  their mea- 
sure of markups  on current output  and a measure of future profitability. 
Because future profitability is unobservable,  they must use a proxy. They 
use  two  methods:  (1) the  q method  and  (2) estimation  of a difference 
equation.  They are very careful in their estimation,  using  several differ- 
ent estimation  procedures  for each method.  In general the results  sup- 
port the collusive  model.  However,  these  results are entirely dependent 
on their estimate  of the markup.  The negative  effect of y is due  to their 
finding  that the markup is countercyclical. 
It seems  that there  is a simpler  way  to estimate  the impact of future 
changes  in profitability on the markup. A known  change in future corpo- 
rate tax rates will affect future profitability. Therefore, according to their 
model  if  tax rates  are expected  to  decrease  in  the  future,  the  current 
markup  should  decrease.  Such  evidence  would  complement  the  evi- 
dence  they present  in their paper. Discussion  *  139 
5. Concluding  Comments 
In sum,  Rotemberg and Woodford have presented  provocative  evidence 
for a collusive  model  of the business  cycle.  However,  neither  their evi- 
dence  against the competitive  model  nor their evidence  for the collusive 
model  is  completely  compelling.  Other  models,  such  as  models  with 
external increasing  returns, can produce many of the same results. Thus, 
the evidence  available thus far is not decisive. 
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Discussion 
In response  to Valerie Ramey, Julio Rotemberg offered that one  alterna- 
tive model  to accommodate  various  observations  is declining  marginal 
costs.  Rotemberg  and Woodford assume  increasing  returns through  the 
presence  of fixed costs,  but they do not assume  declining marginal costs. 
He  doubts  that  internal  declining  marginal  costs  explains  the  puzzles 
because  one  does  not  observe  firms shutting  down  and bunching  pro- 
duction.  Also,  in  recessions  firms choose  to  shut  down  certain plants 
that likely have higher marginal costs.  External declining  marginal costs 
is problematic because  no one has developed  a convincing  story of what 
they are. 
Martin Eichenbaum  raised  two  points  concerning  the  acyclicality  of 
real wages.  First, he pointed  out that labor hoarding and varying capital 
utilization  rates  in  a  competitive  model  with  shocks  to  aggregate  de- 
mand  can easily  accommodate  the lack of a correlation between  wages 
and  hours  worked.  Second,  he  argued  that many  shocks  hit the econ- 
omy and that one need  not have a model that provides  a zero correlation 
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because  one  does  not  observe  firms shutting  down  and bunching  pro- 
duction.  Also,  in  recessions  firms choose  to  shut  down  certain plants 
that likely have higher marginal costs.  External declining  marginal costs 
is problematic because  no one has developed  a convincing  story of what 
they are. 
Martin Eichenbaum  raised  two  points  concerning  the  acyclicality  of 
real wages.  First, he pointed  out that labor hoarding and varying capital 
utilization  rates  in  a  competitive  model  with  shocks  to  aggregate  de- 
mand  can easily  accommodate  the lack of a correlation between  wages 
and  hours  worked.  Second,  he  argued  that many  shocks  hit the econ- 
omy and that one need  not have a model that provides  a zero correlation 140  DISCUSSION 
for every  shock.  Gregory Mankiw, however,  noted  that real wages  were 
not particularly high  in the  1982 recession,  which  was  plausibly  caused 
by monetary  authorities.  Valerie Ramey also pointed  out that the same is 
true  when  one  uses  military  purchases  to  identify  aggregate  demand 
shocks.  Rotemberg  indicated  that periods  of high rates of capital utiliza- 
tion  should  be  accompanied  by  low  rates  of  investment.  Investment, 
however,  is procyclical, and therefore variations in capital utilization will 
not solve  the puzzle. 
Robert Hall illustrated  the differences  between  his paper and Rotem- 
berg and Woodford's.  Whereas he suggests  that the lack of movement  in 
real  wages  results  from  a  flat  labor  demand  curve,  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford offer that the marginal cost curve is steep,  and countercyclical 
markups  lead  to acyclical real wages.  Their different conclusions  result 
from different  identifying  assumptions.  Hall assumes  that variations in 
markups  are uncorrelated  with  his aggregate  demand  instruments  and 
subsequently  measures  a large  elasticity  of  labor demand.  Rotemberg 
and Woodford  assume  a smaller value for the elasticity of labor demand 
and  find  that  markups  are  countercyclical.  Otherwise,  the  regression 
equation  both develop  are functionally  equivalent. 
Robert Gordon indicated that he had initially thought that the acyclical- 
ity of real wages  arose from a mixture of demand  and supply  shocks.  He 
believed  that  real wages  were  procyclical  in  the  1970s and  1980s,  and 
that once  one  removed  supply  shocks,. real wages  were countercyclical. 
He  presented  some  evidence,  however,  that  proved  his  priors  to  be 
mistaken.  After detrending  real wages  by more than a single trend, one 
does  not find a significant  negative  correlation with  capacity utilization 
rates over the 1960s, early 1970s and late 1980s. 
Mark Bils suggested  that  straight-time  wages  are a poor measure  of 
the marginal cost of an extra unit of labor. Robert Barsky argued that his 
work,  as well  as work by Kydland  and Prescott,  Stockman,  and others 
cited  in  the  paper,  advises  against  the  use  of  aggregate  real  wages. 
Composition  effects dominate. 
Olivier  Blanchard  asserted  that  simultaneity  bias  in  the  regressions 
involving  q was  more  problematic  than  was  treated  in  the  paper.  For 
example,  the change in the share of capital in Europe has increased 5-10% 
over the last decade.  This is likely independent  of changes  in collusion. 
Moreover, shocks  such as this will move markups and stock market eval- 
uations.  Thus, errors in the regression  equation will be correlated with all 
of the variables. Rotemberg agreed and stated that they plan to develop  a 
more structural model  allowing  for exogenous  variations in markups. 